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Abstract: 
The purpose of this research is to examine China’s emerging role in peacebuilding. With a 
fast-growing economy, China is becoming very influential and has increased its political lev-
erage in conflict-affected countries. At the same time, China’s foreign policy and strategy 
are evolving and Beijing is becoming more proactive in engaging and intervening on peace-
building efforts. China has developed a unique peacebuilding approach, one that is based 
on economic growth as way to alleviate poverty and social unrest. China could contribute to 
bringing these alternative and complementary perspectives to the Peacebuilding debate and 
open this field to non-Western understandings. This research is going to examine China’s 
approach, its origins in China’s domestic situation and how China is exporting this model at 
the international level. Some of the aspects that will be analyse include: general aspects of 
the Chinese civilisation, philosophy and history, the domestic situation as well as on the 
ways that China handles its domestic conflicts in Xinjiang and Tibet; and some of the partic-
ularities and characteristics of Chinese foreign policy that shape the way it exports peace-
building policies to the international arena. The intervention of China in the conflict of Kachin, 
Myanmar will illustrate how Chinese peacebuilding is evolving and moving away from its 
Westphalian principles of non-interference. China has thus become a key actor in supporting 
peace and stability and it should be part of any debate around peacebuilding moving forward 
based on shared interests in, and concern to promote peace and stability.   
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my dearest friend Eva, for being so strong, kind and courageous 
You will always be a true source of inspiration  
iii 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter One: Rising Powers and International Conflict Resolution 1 
China’s emergent role in conflict affected states 3 
China and Human Rights 5 
Methodology and current state of academic literature on China 8 
Academic Secondary Research 8 
Field Work in Myanmar 10 
Chapter Overview 12 
Chapter Two: Liberal Peace in Crisis? 15 
What is Peacebuilding? 16 
Peacebuilding as Multidimensional Peacekeeping (1989-99) 18 
Peacebuilding as Statebuilding & Liberal Peacebuilding (1999-2005) 18 
Statebuilding as Peacebuilding 20 
Critiques of the Liberal Peace Project 21 
Nationally-owned Peacebuilding or Peacebuilding from below (2009-2014) 24 
Emancipatory Peacebuilding 25 
Local Liberal hybrid form 25 
Support of National Dialogue and Peace Processes 27 
Is the Liberal Peace Project in Crisis? Alternative models 28 
Chapter Three: The Chinese Approach to Peacebuilding 31 
Characteristics of the Chinese Peacebuilding Approach 31 
A “Civilisation State” - Influences of the Chinese Peacebuilding Approach 34 
A civilisation state and the role of Confucianism 35 
The role and characteristics of the Chinese state 37 
China’s internal conflicts: the origins of the Chinese Peacebuilding Approach 39 
Social conflict in China 40 
Ethnic Unrest in the Western Border Regions 41 
Applying the Chinese Peacebuilding Approach at home 48 
Chapter Four: China’s Global Peace Engagement Strategy 49 
A unique foreign policy 51 
Roots of the Chinese Foreign Policy 51 
Peaceful Coexistence: The Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy 52 
From non-intervention to creative involvement 54 
China’s peaceful economic rise 55 
Chinese Soft Power 56 
iv 
 
China and International Norms and Institutions 57 
Exporting China’s Global Peace Engagement Strategy 59 
International Peacebuilding with Chinese Characteristics 60 
Chinese Foreign Aid 62 
Implementing the Global Peace Engagement Strategy in Africa 64 
An evolving foreign policy and strategy 66 
Chapter Five: China’s role in the conflict in Kachin, Myanmar 68 
China’s Neighbourhood Diplomacy 69 
China’s Myanmar Policy 71 
Background to the Kachin Conflict 73 
Root Causes of the Conflict 74 
Attempted peace negotiations in Kachin 75 
The 2015 nation-wide Ceasefire Agreement 76 
China’s role in the Kachin Conflict 77 
The Chinese Dilemma - Relationship with the armed forces 79 
Conflict in Kokang - another intervention from China 80 
More than Creative Involvement? Reasons for intervention 82 
Moving from a non-intervention approach 84 
Chapter Six: Same objective, different approaches: Opportunities for Peacebuilding 85 
Different approaches to Peacebuilding 86 
Typology of Chinese Interventions 89 
Successes and challenges of the Chinese approach 91 
Economic Development and Peacebuilding 91 
Promoting a strong and developmental State 94 
Conflict prevention as opposed to military intervention 95 
Looking forward: Opportunities for Peacebuilding 95 
Review of the UN peacebuilding Architecture 96 
Can China become a key actor in supporting peace and stability? 98 
Annex 1: List of people interviewed in Myanmar 101 
Bibliography 103 
  
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The supreme act of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting 
 
Sun Tzu 
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Chapter One: Rising Powers and International Conflict 
Resolution 
 
 
‘Let China sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world’  
Napoleon 
 
 
We are witnessing a profound change in the global order. Although the United States re-
mains the lone superpower, the rest of the world is catching up. China is leading the rise of 
new emerging powers including the other BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) into the global order and they are beginning to steadily increase their interna-
tional influence. This phenomenon has happened at the same time as the financial crisis in 
2008-2009 which weakened the leadership of the US and the European Union leading to a 
demystification of the Western world in many non-Western countries. In the West, analysts 
and policy makers are grappling with what this rise of emerging powers (and China in par-
ticular), means for international relations and foreign policy. At the same time, Chinese pol-
icy makers are also coming to terms with this new found influence and the responsibilities 
that come with it.  
 
For many Asian countries, the financial crisis confirmed the ‘wisdom of Asian countries’, in 
adopting a pragmatic rather than ideological approach to economic growth and development 
(Mahbubani, 2008). Many analysts now expect Asian economies, especially China and In-
dia, to provide greater global leadership to help steer the world through the emerging global 
challenges. But it is not only a different type of economic model that emerging countries are 
advocating for, they also want to use their influence to create a more inclusive and demo-
cratic international order. These countries share common experiences, existing as states 
who are ‘on the outside looking in’. These states hold an alternative vision of a multilateral 
system, that is strongly rules based so as to constrain the ability of stronger states to domi-
nate the system as a whole (De Carvalho and De Coning, 2013). Although they might have 
divergent views on established norms, they are cautious and want to ensure that reforms 
are evolutionary in scope and pace. They are however, outspoken in the need to reform 
international institutions, including primarily the UN Security Council (bar China and Russia 
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who already have a permanent seat at the Security Council) so it can be replaced by a more 
globally representative system and processes. 
 
The alterations and evolution of the ‘new world order’ are also reflected in international con-
flict resolution with Western actors no longer being the only actors when it comes to sup-
porting global peace and stability. Emerging countries are becoming more proactive in shap-
ing international systems and norms, including peacekeeping and peacebuilding agendas. 
Most of the emerging powers support either the liberal peace or a basic liberal international 
order, however, colonial history influences how the act, as they work to protect their sover-
eignty, gain status, and seek increased power to displace the Western centric influence in 
world politics. Rising powers are now bringing new schools of thought and divergent views 
on what had previously been a heavily Western-dominated field. There are for instance in-
creasing numbers of Non-Western scholars that question the ‘iconisation of democracy’ and 
the ‘ideological crusade’ of Western countries after the Cold War, that insist that democracy 
can be exported to any society everywhere in the world, regardless of its stage of political 
development (Mahbubani, 2008). Another contentious issue between Western and emer-
gent countries is around intervention. In general terms, most countries in the West have over 
the last decade increased their willingness to intervene in crisis zones, with force if neces-
sary, to protect civilians and to promote democracy. Meanwhile, the rising powers take a 
more nuanced view, favouring instead the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. 
Most rising powers have demonstrated commitment to international peacekeeping (particu-
larly if led by the United Nations), however; they are less enthusiastic about peacebuilding, 
because they perceive it to have been abused by the West as a tool to impose neoliberal 
values on weak states. For instance, the West is seen to use the UN and other international 
and regional organisations to increase the West’s influence in the international system (Rich-
mond & Tellidis, 2013). In terms of foreign aid, emerging donors have a different approach 
to Western donors as they frame their development goals as solidarity within the context of 
sovereignty, which creates a tension over peacebuilding and development between the sup-
porters of the current liberal model (mainly Western nations) and some of the BRICS coun-
tries (notably, Russia, China and India). These emerging countries also agree on issues, 
particularly on the significance of the state as the main partner for aid, development, peace-
building, and statebuilding.  
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Most of the new emerging powers share a desire to promote peace and stability. However, 
one of the challenges that the ‘new world order’ will have in the coming decades is that with 
the emergence of new actors there is the potential for a significant impact on the identity, 
legitimacy, capacity, coordination, and representation of the international community, and 
the organisations, institutions, agencies, and international non-governmental organisations 
that are part of it. This can however also create opportunities to enrich the foreign policy and 
conflict resolution field, by developing forums and mechanisms for constructive policy en-
gagement and dialogue with new rising powers, which could represent an opportunity to 
engage based on shared interests in, and concern to promote peace and stability. 
 
China’s emergent role in conflict affected states 
 
China is globally the most influential of these emerging actors, due primarily to its excep-
tional economic growth and the role its economy has played in the global system. Some 
equate the rise in China’s share of the world product as a fundamental shift in the balance 
of global power, and without considering other dimensions of power this has led to a new 
international system where ‘geo-economics’ has replaced ‘geopolitics’ (S. Nye Jr., 2011). 
China has worked within the current international system to expand its economy and in-
crease its visibility and status as a global political player, while avoiding actions that directly 
challenge US hegemony (Schweller & Pu, 2011). China has thus accommodated US he-
gemony on one hand but at the same time, Beijing is starting to challenge and contest the 
legitimacy of the US. Relying on existing institutionalised channels, China has sought to 
increase its political influence and prestige through active participation in, not confrontation 
with, the existing order. Some of the strategies that China has used include: promoting mul-
tilateralism, participating in and creating new international organisations, pursuing a proac-
tive ‘soft power’ strategy and setting the agenda within international and regional organisa-
tions.  
 
As the success of China’s economy depends upon its access to overseas markets and re-
sources, it has become a major investor and donor in many parts of the developing world, 
in Asia, Africa and now increasingly in Middle East and Latin America. This injection of re-
sources has facilitated the creation of very close links to the governments of the countries 
that China partners with that used to depend on Western’s assistance. This has created a 
situation in which China has considerably more political leverage with these countries and 
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in many cases, it has replaced traditional donors such as the US or the UK as the main 
partner of choice.  
 
Many of the countries with close economic ties to China are affected or are recently emerg-
ing from violent conflict. The aid and infrastructure projects that China provides are becom-
ing part of the conflict equation. On one hand, the investment and engagement may actually 
increase the risk of violent conflict, by reinforcing the patters of economic or political exclu-
sion that gave rise to grievances, tensions, and violence in the first place. On the other hand, 
these projects can have substantial benefits in countries where infrastructure has been de-
stroyed or left un-repaired during periods of conflict which could potentially support peace 
efforts. China’s engagement has therefore altered the context in which international efforts 
to build peace and stability take place. It has also put China in a position where it can either 
support or undermine the peacebuilding influence of Western donors in conflict-affected 
states. 
 
Although many analysts believe that China’s interests are purely extractive and of economic 
nature, China’s approach has developed and evolved as it has increasingly interacted with 
other powers and institutions in the international arena. Within China the terminology of 
‘peacebuilding’ or ‘post-conflict’ does not really exists. According to Saferworld, security is-
sues are divided from development or economic cooperation, which is mainly due to lack of 
understanding but also because security issues are seen as too political (Saferworld, 2012). 
However, China has developed a unique approach to what the western world understands 
as ‘peacebuilding’, an approach that is influenced by China’s own history and experience as 
well as by its foreign policy strategy and domestic pressure. 
 
The emergence of major new players like China also provides an opportunity to reassess 
and refresh policy approaches to conflict-affected states. The liberal peace is itself coming 
under criticism in Western circles and by non-western academics for being an essentially 
Western model. But although the liberal peacebuilding project has already been institution-
alised as prevailing norms across the United Nations, there are increasingly more opportu-
nities to revisit this model. As an emerging actor (and international donor) in the international 
system, China could potentially contribute to bringing alternative and complementary per-
spectives to the Peacebuilding debate that could open this field to non-Western understand-
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ings. But in order to comprehend Beijing’s approach there is a need for a more careful un-
derstanding of Chinese perspectives and principles which will help in understanding China’s 
growing presence, influence and behaviour in conflict affected countries. 
 
In order to contribute to this debate, this research is going to examine China’s unique peace-
building approach, its origins in China’s domestic situation and how China is exporting this 
model at the international level. Some of the aspects that influence the Chinese peacebuild-
ing approach will be analysed. These include: general aspects of the Chinese civilisation, 
philosophy and history, the domestic situation as well as on the ways that China handles its 
internal conflicts in Xinjiang and Tibet; and some of the particularities and characteristics of 
Chinese foreign policy that shape the way it exports peacebuilding policies to the interna-
tional arena. This research will also illustrate how China has implemented its peacebuilding 
approach in dealing with its domestic ethnic conflict in the Western province in Xinjiang as 
well as how China has exported its approach outside its boundaries by actively intervening 
in the conflict of Kachin, Myanmar. These two case studies will illustrate some of the oppor-
tunities and challenges of the Chinese Peacebuilding approach. The example of Myanmar 
will also demonstrate how Chinese peacebuilding is evolving and is now being more proac-
tive and is moving away from its Westphalian principles of non-interference and respecting 
state sovereignty.  
 
China and Human Rights 
 
In the past decades, China has demonstrated an increased ‘openness’ at the international 
level. However, at the domestic level, China remains an authoritarian state in which the 
Chinese Communist Party constitutionally is the paramount source of power. Organisations 
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented widespread hu-
man rights violations in the country, especially with regards to the rule of law and minorities’ 
rights.  
 
The evolution of China’s approach to international human rights institutions and mecha-
nisms run in parallel to its openness at the international level. Since its decision to open-up 
to the world economy and its institutions, China has shown progress with international hu-
man rights commitments in the last two decades (and more so since the new leadership 
assumed power in 2013). China has opted into the international human rights framework by 
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signing up to a wide range of human rights treaties. For instance, China signed and ratified 
a range of human rights treaties in the 1980s, including conventions on race discrimination, 
discrimination against women, apartheid, refugees and genocide. It also contributed to the 
drafting of the UN Convention Against Torture before becoming a party to this treaty in 1988 
(Sceats & Breslin, 2012). In recent years it has also officially accepted the universality of 
human rights and it has established a dedicated EU-China Human Rights dialogue that aims 
at promoting human rights, and to foster the rule of law and civil society (European Union 
External Action Fact Sheet, 2016). China has also shown progress in areas such as building 
greater openness and democratisation, rights for internal migrants, access to social services 
for persons with disabilities, and the abolition of the one child policy in 2015 (Human Rights 
Watch, 2015).  
 
Despite this progress, the country remains an authoritarian state. The country still limits 
fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly, and religion, 
when their exercise is perceived to threaten one-party rule. China continues to view human 
rights in strongly aspirational rather than legal terms. It argues for priority to be placed on 
socio-economic rights and the right to development, and continues to insist that human 
rights should be implemented according to a country’s national conditions (Sceats & Breslin, 
2012). China has tended to invoke the right to sovereignty to deflect international scrutiny 
when human rights violations were committed. For instance, in the aftermath of the Tianan-
men events in 1989, Chinese officials argued that “the use of force against the protesters 
was within its sovereignty and necessary to quell the rebellion, protect the interests of its 
people and ensure the development of the country and the success of the reform process” 
(in Sceats and Breslin, 2012, page 7). In the Chinese conception, therefore, sovereignty is 
presented as the cornerstone of or precondition for all rights. Other features of Chinese 
conception of human rights include the following: 
 
1. Prioritisation of socio-economic rights: China has consistently promoted a hierarchy 
of rights in which social and economic rights are privileged over civil and political 
rights (Weiwei, 2012). In its 1991 white paper, the Chinese government asserted that 
‘the right to subsistence is the most important of all human rights, without which the 
other rights are out of the question’ (in Sceats and Breslin, 2012 page 7).  
2. Emphasis on development: According to the Chinese view, human rights are viewed 
as a ‘noble goal’ or a cause’ that should be pursued by a state according to its level 
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of development rather than a set of binding international obligations. China has sup-
ported the idea of the so-called ‘Asian Values’ as well as promoting the idea of a 
‘China Model of Democracy’ which seeks to support economic growth at the expense 
of civil and political rights (Subedi, 2015) 
3. Focus on the rights of the many: China has promoted collective rights vested in peo-
ple (or the state) such as the right to development and the right to self-determination 
in the struggle against colonialism as opposed to the individualistic orientation of the 
human rights framework. More recently, China and other states have suggested that 
the international human rights framework should be expanded to recognise the ‘right 
to international solidarity’ or the ‘right to peace’ (Sceats and Breslin, 2012) 
4. Stability and peace as a precondition for human rights: China believes that public 
order, peace and stability is a paramount obligation of the state, even at the expense 
of fundamental human rights.  
 
The issue of human rights in China remains a controversial and sensitive one. Human rights 
remains one of the priorities for Western states (despite significant lapses in the context of 
counter-terrorism policies and operations following the 9-11 attacks in the US) and for West-
ern civil society organisations. The view of China as an authoritarian regime poses a chal-
lenge to China’s peacebuilding strategy as it questions the legitimacy of China as a peace-
building actor. China’s top-down approach and its lack of public participation and promotion 
of civil society clash with some of the fundamental principles of the liberal peacebuilding 
model. However, although it is important to acknowledge China’s human rights concerns, 
China is becoming an increasingly important actor on the peacebuilding field and therefore 
is an actor that we need to consider and examine.  
 
China is becoming a key player moving forward in the peacebuilding debate due to its dis-
tinct peacebuilding approach and because of its influence and leverage in conflict-affected 
states. Therefore, this thesis will analyse some of the commonalities and differences be-
tween the Western and the Chinese peacebuilding approach with the hope that it will con-
tribute to any discussions on the review of the liberal peacebuilding model. The rise of China 
on the conflict resolution field should be seen as an opportunity. As stated by Mahbubani, 
“Western minds should reflect on the Chinese wisdom in translating the Western word ‘crisis’ 
by combining two Chinese characters, ‘danger’ and ‘opportunity’. Too many Western minds 
are looking at dangers, few are looking at opportunities” (Mahbubani, 2008, page 7). The 
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Chinese view on peacebuilding represent a new opportunity for the conflict resolution field 
and we should learn to work with it, rather than against it.  
 
Methodology and current state of academic literature on China 
 
This research on China’s approach to peacebuilding is based on two methodologies: an 
analysis of available secondary sources and data; and through data collection obtained 
through open-ended and informal interviews conducted in several trips to Myanmar between 
2013 and 2014. 
Academic Secondary Research 
 
Firstly, the analytical part of the research is based on analysis of secondary sources. This 
has been possible thanks to the new emergent interest in Chinese vision of world order 
which has facilitated the translation into English of work from Chinese academics and for-
eign policy analysts that was not previously available. Through the analysis of Chinese work 
it is possible to gather that there is an internal debate in China at the moment between those 
who want to accommodate Western power and those who think that China should be more 
proactive in its foreign policy. They include globalists who argue that it is the very fact that 
China is now more powerful that makes ‘modesty’ and ‘prudence’ even more important (Jisi). 
On the other side are those who argue that China must now pursue a more assertive foreign 
policy in which it helps to define the rules of foreign policy rather than simply following poli-
cies crafted in Washington and elsewhere (Yizhou). Although the increased translation has 
expanded the amount of literature available from Chinese scholars, still most of the studies 
on the China rise and its behaviour in the international system have been conducted by 
Western academics. This is a limitation as only a few Western academics (Callahan, 
Jacques, Kissinger, Pye amongst others) have critically studied China from an objective 
perspective, without a ‘Western lens’, trying to understand the roots and culture that influ-
ences Chinese behaviour without being biased towards Western models and principles. 
These scholars have conducted studies around the Asian and Chinese values and the dif-
ferences in their culture that affect the role of the state and the relationship between the 
state and the population. For instance, Jacques has analysed how Chinese civilisation (in-
cluding Confucianism) has a profound impacted on the relationship between the state and 
the population which differs from the Western conception. Pye has looked at the Asian ten-
dency to place more value on the collective and be less sensitive than the west on the values 
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of individualism. Callahan has examined some Confucian concepts, such as the concept of 
Tan Xia, to explain how China sees the global world order and the impacts this view has on 
their foreign policy decisions. Therefore, the work from these academics helps understand-
ing China’s vision of the world order and its behaviour and interactions with international 
institutions and in conflict-affected countries. Similarly, most of the conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding literature has been developed by Western academics and universities which 
has led to many critiques by some western and non-western academics around the univer-
sality of these principles. For instance, in terms of peacebuilding models, western academ-
ics have not produced an alternative and distinct model to the liberal peacebuilding project. 
As it will be examined in Chapter two of this research, all alternative models and approaches 
are still not rooted on Western liberal values even if the liberal approach has been chal-
lenged by many Western academics. This lack of alternative and viable models has been 
interpreted by some academics as an attempt to universalise western concepts. For in-
stance, Asian academics tend to criticise the ‘Western imperialism of ideas’ and the fact that 
these ideas tend to benefit only a small portion of the population and powerful lobbies as 
opposed to the global population (Mahbubani, 2008).  
 
In terms of China’s view on international conflict resolution, the majority of the research 
conducted so far has been on the rising role of China on supporting peacekeeping opera-
tions. In terms of China’s view on international peacebuilding, as there is no overarching 
Chinese policy on conflict-affected states or for dealing with conflicts within China, policy 
and research focus on civil wars and state fragility is extremely limited. However, quite a lot 
of work has been done in the last few years by the organisation Saferworld in understanding 
the role that China plays in conflict affected countries. Other authors (Lei, Odgaard) have 
done recent studies on the views of China on coexistence and peacebuilding. It is likely that 
this field of research will expand in the next few years as China becomes more involved in 
peacebuilding activities. In terms of case studies, most academic work had previously fo-
cussed in Africa, and the growing influence China has in the continent through economic 
trade and foreign aid in conflict affected countries. Less research has been conducted on 
China’s role in the conflict around its periphery. In the case of Myanmar, only a handful of 
practitioners and think tanks have done an analysis of the role of China in the Kachin conflict 
and on the overall Peace Process (ICG, Haacke, Sun). As one of the first examples of an 
intervention of China on a sovereign state, this research aims to fill this gap in the literature 
by proving the background and analysis of China’s intervention in the conflict in Kachin.  
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Field Work in Myanmar 
 
The second methodology used for this research has been through open-ended informal 
qualitative interviews in Myanmar, including interviews with Kachin displaced population in 
the Northern Shan state in Myanmar in several visits to the country during 2013 and 2014. 
This has been possible because of the work I do with Save the Children International (SC). 
During 2013 and 2014 I supported the SC office in Myanmar in developing and implementing 
a conflict sensitivity strategy across its programmes in the country. Through this work I was 
able to engage with different peacebuilding actors working in Yangon, such as local and 
international NGOs, different UN agencies, embassies and donors and I also attended 
peace coordination meetings and forums This gave me an opportunity to discuss formally 
and informally with people that were directly involved in the negotiations of the peace pro-
cess who confirmed the discreet role that China was playing in the process. It also gave me 
the opportunity to discuss the peace process and the role of China with Myanmar people 
working in SC and in other organisations.  
 
In total I conducted 29 interviews (24 in Yangon and 5 in Northern Shan - see Annex 1 for a 
list of people interviewed in Myanmar). I selected the interviewees on the basis of their en-
gagement and knowledge of the Myanmar peace process and the Kachin conflict. However, 
working for an international organisation in a conflict area meant that I could not freely ask 
questions as it could jeopardise the impartiality of my role and of the organisation. For these 
reasons, the interviews had to be as informal as possible (in most cases they where con-
ducted in cafes or small restaurants) and I could not take any notes as that could make 
people nervous and/or unwilling to speak freely. This meant that I had to write notes after 
the interviews and I could not collect any direct quotes.  
 
Some of the interviewees were international staff that had worked in Myanmar for several 
years and that were very familiar with the particularities of the conflict, the government and 
the peace process. They provided a more objective view of the conflict and the interests of 
the parties involved. However, as I contacted them through Save the Children, the interviews 
and discussions with them were very informal and no notes or quotes were taken during the 
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discussions. The Myanmar interviewees were mainly Save the Children staff that I had de-
veloped a relationship of trust with or people that I had met through Save the Children and 
who trusted the organisation. Interviewing Myanmar people is quite challenging because 
Myanmar has been isolated for decades and until recently Myanmar people could not be 
seen discussing matters with foreigners. Although with the government’s ‘opening up policy’ 
this is no longer the case, many people still find it difficult to openly discuss the conflict and 
peace process in Myanmar as well as anything that could be regarded as a criticism against 
the government. Also, because of the civil rights restrictions, lack of free independent media 
as well as a strict education system, there is limited critical analytical thinking education in 
Myanmar. This is especially acute in relation to discussions on ethnic conflict or the religious 
clashes with Muslim communities in Rakhine. Many people have a very biased and partisan 
view on these conflicts where tensions and intractable positions are fuelled by rumours.  
 
All interviews with international staff in Yangon were conducted in English but for most of 
the Myanmar interviews (both in Yangon and in Northern Shan state) I had to use a trans-
lator. Ensuring reliable translation in Myanmar is a significant challenge. Although the official 
language is Burmese, there are at least seven recognised regional languages and most of 
the ethnic groups do not speak Burmese. For the reasons mentioned above, it is very difficult 
to find a translator that you can trust that will translate the literal conversation and not censor 
anything that s/he will disagree with (for not being in line with the government policy). Be-
cause of the sensitivity of the subject, even Save the Children translators could not always 
be used, as they will refuse to discuss these topics.  
 
As part of the work of Save the Children in Myanmar I also led a conflict assessment in 
Kachin in March 2014 for SC. The conflict assessment was conducted on several levels. 
Firstly, an initial desk review of the conflict in Kachin was conducted through an analysis of 
available secondary data (academic journals, reports, news articles etc.). The aim of the 
desk review was to get understanding of the conflict history, causes, stakeholder analysis 
and conflict dynamics. Secondly, a context analysis was also conducted in order to under-
stand the perceptions of the population on the conflict and their visions for peace, the stake-
holders of the conflict as well to get an understanding of the conflict dynamics on the ground. 
This data was collected in two different ways: through a context analysis exercise with na-
tional Kachin and Myanmar staff members as part of a one day “Do no Harm” workshop in 
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which a total number of 30 staff members from SC and local Kachin organisations partici-
pate; and through interviews and a wider data collection exercise at the household level in 
ten internally displaced (IDP) camps. There were several limitations with this assessment.  
The main one was around language. Kachin people speak a different language than the 
Myanmar one which meant that everything had to be translated from English to Myanmar 
and then to Kachin. Also many Kachin people are reluctant to speak to Myanmar people as 
they think that they work in the government. Many also provide with an ‘official line of an-
swers’ as opposed to their own opinions due to fear of being arrested by the Myanmar gov-
ernment. The sensitivity of the research topic meant that direct questions around the conflict 
and around the role of China could not be made. Furthermore, when respondents referred 
to China it was difficult to know if they were referring to official Chinese government author-
ities or Chinese individuals (mafias or other groups that operate near the border with Myan-
mar).  
 
For all these reasons, this research does not include any direct quote or reference. The 
information gathered through the interviews is used to provide a sense of how the people 
both in Kachin and in the rest of Myanmar perceive the role of China in their country as well 
as their perceptions around the Myanmar peace process.       
 
Chapter Overview 
 
 
This research provides a discussion of China’s peacebuilding approach, where it comes 
from and how it is being exported, by examining the characteristics of Chinese foreign policy 
and the evolving role of China in conflict-affected states. As an emergent power with in-
creasing influence in many countries and with international institutions, this research will 
argue that China has become a key actor in supporting peace and stability and that therefore 
China should be part of any debate around peacebuilding moving forward. In order to illus-
trate all of these points, the research is divided in the following chapters:  
 
Chapter 2 will examine the Liberal Peace theory, its definition and how the concept has 
evolved in the last decades. Although academics are defining alternative approaches to the 
liberal peacebuilding model based on some of the critiques it has received, none of these 
alternative approaches is completely detached from liberal values. As advocated by Cos-
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mopolitan Conflict Resolution proponents, this chapter will argue that the peacebuilding def-
inition could be enriched with Non-Western perspectives and approaches. As an emerging 
and influencing actor, China could contribute in defining these alternative models by bringing 
its own experience and definitions of peacebuilding 
 
Chapter 3 will examine some of the characteristics of the Chinese Peacebuilding Approach. 
It will look at where this approach comes from, its origins in Confucian values and other 
unique characters of the Chinese civilisation. In order to discuss how China is applying this 
approach within its territory, this chapter will study some of social conflicts in China, paying 
more attention to the ethnic unrest in the Western province in Xinjiang as an example of how 
the Chinese government has applied the peacebuilding approach domestically. Although 
the Chinese peacebuilding approach has had some success in increasing standards of living 
in Xinjiang, this chapter will conclude that the approach has had limited positive outcomes 
as it has failed to address some of grievances of the local population and the root causes of 
the conflict.  
 
Chapter 4 will examine some of the characteristics of the Chinese Foreign policy in order to 
understand how China has ‘exported’ its peacebuilding approach. China’s unique approach 
to strategy and diplomacy, which is very distinct from the Western way, will be illustrated as 
well as the evolution of its foreign policy from a limited engagement to a more active position 
with regional and global structures as part of China’s ‘peaceful coexistence’ strategic think-
ing. This chapter will conclude that through China’s global peace engagement strategy, the 
country is exporting a distinct model for international conflict resolution which is demon-
strated in how China supports international peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. As 
an example of how China is implementing its global peace engagement strategy, a case 
study of China’s engagement in Africa will be provided to illustrate this.  
 
Using China’s ‘neighbourhood policy’ as the framework, chapter 5 will discuss China’s poli-
cies and interests in Myanmar that led to the intervention of China in the Kachin conflict. As 
this intervention has marked a turning point in Chinese foreign policy, this chapter will ex-
amine in more detail the characteristics of the Kachin conflict, China’s interests and position 
on the conflict, and some of the dilemmas that China has faced in order to break its sacred 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other sovereign countries.  
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Finally, chapter 6 will provide an analysis of the main differences between the Liberal Peace 
and the Chinese Peacebuilding Approach. Based on the examples from Xinjiang and My-
anmar, the chapter will examine some of the successes and challenges of the Chinese 
peacebuilding approach. Looking at some of the current opportunities through the Review 
of the UN peacebuilding architecture, the chapter will discuss how China could contribute to 
this debate in order to make peacebuilding a more inclusive and global concept. Lastly this 
research will conclude that because of its growing influence and political leverage, China 
can become an actor in supporting peace and stability in conflict affected countries and not 
recognising the impacts of China’s engagement also undermines peacebuilding. Therefore, 
a shared concern in the West and China over stability in conflict-affected states provides a 
foundation for dialogue about peacebuilding.  
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Chapter Two: Liberal Peace in Crisis? 
 
 
‘Human nature is evil and goodness is caused by intentional activity’ 
Xun Zi 
 
 
Violent conflicts around the world have become significantly more complex over the first 
decade and a half of this century. After declining for much of the late 1990s and early 2000s 
major civil wars almost tripled from four in 2007 to eleven in 2014 (Source: United Nations, 
2015). The characteristics of violent conflict have changed in the last years and the security 
landscapes in many regions, such as the Middle East, have been radically transformed with 
the upsurge of internal and regional conflicts. There are new types of armed actors, there is 
an increased growth in violent extremism, and conflicts are becoming more intractable. 
Some of the key elements that have driven these transformations include chronic political 
instability in fragile countries, persistent social volatility and conflict, the proliferation of non-
state armed groups and transnational actors, disputes over land and natural resources, pro-
liferation of small arms and light weapons, weak state systems, and recurring cycles of vio-
lent competition over the state or markets. State capacities and functions are challenged in 
many regions of the world as there is an increased number of states that have limited ca-
pacity to provide people with security, welfare and representation. For instance, in some 
parts of Central and South America, states have lost control of power, authority, and territory 
to organised criminal actors; and in some parts of the Middle East and Africa this has hap-
pened to transnational armed groups. In some regions, territorial control by states is con-
tested, in many cases violently by militia, terrorists or other armed groups. 
 
The transformation of the conflict landscape is also mirrored by a transfiguration in the in-
ternational peacebuilding arena. There is a growing number of emerging actors that play 
important roles in peacebuilding, such as state, non-state or sub-national actors. Many of 
these actors engage with peacebuilding outside existing institutional frameworks and are 
using different labels to advance their efforts and interests in a specific context which is 
leading to confusion over power authorities (White Paper on Peacebuilding). Also, emerging 
non-Western countries such as China, Brazil or Russia have an increased influence in in-
ternational institutions and are being increasingly proactive in peacebuilding agendas. This 
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context presents a challenge to the operating principles of international governmental or-
ganisations as well as to the established peacebuilding architecture that was primarily based 
on western priorities and resolutions. 
 
In order to understand the journey of peacebuilding until the present day, this chapter will 
examine the definition of peacebuilding and its progress over the last three decades. It will 
illustrate the different phases and main characteristics of the Liberal Peace theory and its 
evolution from supporting statebuilding interventions towards a more locally-owned ‘peace-
building from below process’. The Liberal peacebuilding project has received many critiques, 
some of which have been incorporated into the new approaches and definitions. However, 
Western academics have failed to develop a concept that it is not completely detached from 
Western Liberal values. The chapter will conclude that if peacebuilding wants to be a uni-
versal concept, the debate needs to incorporate the views and approaches of non-Western 
academics.  
 
What is Peacebuilding? 
 
Peacebuilding is a very broad concept that has evolved over time. The term was firstly in-
troduced by Johan Galtung in 1975. He defined peacebuilding as achieving positive and 
sustainable peace by creating structures, systems and institutions of peace based on jus-
tice, equity and cooperation that will address the root causes of conflict and support local 
capacity for peace management and conflict resolution (United Nations Peacebuilding Sup-
port Office). Galtung's work emphasised a bottom-up approach that decentralised social and 
economic structures, amounting to a call for a societal shift from structures of coercion and 
violence to a culture of peace. Building from this definition, American sociologist John Paul 
Lederach proposed a different concept of peacebuilding as one in which the aim is to engage 
grassroots, local, NGO, international and other actors to create a sustainable peace pro-
cess. Lederach defines peacebuilding as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, gen-
erates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform 
conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships (Lederach, 1997). The main differ-
ent with Galtung’s definition is that Lederach does not advocate the same degree of struc-
tural change as Galtung. 
 
The evolution of peacebuilding began with the increase in United Nations-mediated peace 
processes in the early 1990s. The United Nations peacebuilding agenda was developed in 
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response to a perceived gap between war and peace. In the aftermath of wars, the interna-
tional community realised that winning the peace had proved vastly more difficult than win-
ning the war. In light of this, building sustainable peace through post-conflict reconciliation 
and institutional reform became a main agenda item for the UN. Peacebuilding then ex-
panded to include many different dimensions, such as disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration and rebuilding governmental, economic and civil society institutions. The con-
cept was popularised in the international community through the United Nations Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report ‘An Agenda for Peace’. The report defined 
post-conflict peacebuilding as an ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (United Nations Peace-
building Support Office). The tendency for countries to fall back into conflict was seen in 
large part as a consequence of states lacking the capacity or will to protect their populations. 
In this logic a more full-fledged intervention became necessary to prevent fragile states from 
constituting a security threat to their own populations (Philipsen, 2014). The particular tasks 
that this might entail include ‘driving the previously warring parties and the restoration of 
order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and 
training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect 
human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal 
and informal processes of political participation’ (Paris, 2004). However, the UN Agenda for 
Peace definition mainly focussed on the democratic rebuilding of the states after an armed 
conflict which provided a narrower focus than Galtung's original definition. 
 
With the emergent role of the United Nations as well as the international community in 
peacebuilding processes, different notions of peacebuilding emerged, reflecting both suc-
cessive experience in peace operations and evolving scholarly ideas as they reacted to one 
another and perceived ‘lessons learned’ of international interventions. Three phases in the 
evolution of peacebuilding can be identified:  
 
1. Peacebuilding as Multidimensional Peacekeeping in the early 1990s.  
2. Liberal Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in the 2000s  
3. Nationally-owned peacebuilding or peacebuilding from below since 2000 onwards 
 
The next section is going to examine the evolution of peacebuilding approaches during these 
phases as well as some of the critiques.   
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Peacebuilding as Multidimensional Peacekeeping (1989-99) 
 
In the early 1990s, the successful mediation and peaceful facilitation of several long-running 
civil wars in Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique and Guatemala, 
popularised models for peacemaking. The international community began to look at ‘peace 
implementation’ which encompassed international monitoring and verification of peace 
agreements. Within the UN Secretariat, peacebuilding activities largely fell under the term 
‘multi-dimensional peacekeeping’, with civilian requirements expanding rapidly to include 
monitoring and advising on political, human rights, civil affairs, electoral, disarmament and 
demobilisation, humanitarian assistance and policing tasks (Call, 2015). For instance, the 
UN was called to monitor the conduct of local police in Namibia, while preparing the country 
for its first democratic election and assisting in the preparation of the new national constitu-
tion. These functions went well beyond the constraints that had traditionally been imposed 
on peacekeepers, including the prohibition on involvement in the domestic affairs of the host 
countries (Paris, 2004). But more importantly, these interventions started to reflect a differ-
ent approach to conflict management and security as they illustrated the idea that maintain-
ing peace in post-conflict societies required a multi-faceted approach, with attention to a 
wide range of social, economic and institutional needs. The term ‘Peace operations’ 
emerged as a generic label for the wide variety of missions that the UN began to conduct at 
this time, since many of these interventions no longer seemed to fit the traditional peace-
keeping approach.  
 
Peacebuilding as Statebuilding & Liberal Peacebuilding (1999-
2005) 
 
At the 2005 World Summit, the United Nations began creating a peacebuilding architecture 
to coordinate the United Nation’s Peacebuilding Efforts that produced three organisations: 
the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the UN Peacebuilding Fund; and the UN Peacebuilding 
Support Office. During this period, all of the UN peace operations pursued the same general 
strategy for promoting stable and lasting peace: democratisation and marketisation. The 
typical formula of peacebuilding included, among others, promoting civil and political rights, 
preparing and administering democratic elections, drafting national constitutions, training 
police and justice officials, promoting the development of independent ‘civil society’ organi-
sations, encouraging the development of free-market economies, and stimulating the growth 
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of private enterprise while reducing the state’s role in the economy (Paris, 2004). Because 
of the scope and breadth of these peacebuilding activities, and the emphasis on building 
institutions based upon market economies and democracy, contemporary peacebuilding be-
gan to be labelled as ‘liberal peacebuilding’. According to Duffield the idea of liberal peace 
combined ‘liberal’ (as in contemporary liberal economic and political tenets) with ‘peace’ (the 
policy predilection towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction). He described lib-
eral power as one based on the management and regulation of economic, political and so-
cial processes (Duffield, 2008). 
 
Liberal peacebuilding was based on the post-Cold War conviction that political and eco-
nomic liberalism offered a key to solving a broad range of social, political and economic 
challenges: from internal and international violence to poverty, famine, corruption, and even 
environmental destruction. The core argument in favour of liberalisation is that it promotes 
peace: countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with 
one another. In the ‘Agenda for Democratisation’, Boutros-Ghali concluded that the promo-
tion of democracy was essential because ‘peace, development and democracy are inextri-
cably linked’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1996). Rule of law also become a priority in external interven-
tions aimed at the reestablishment of order and the promotion of peace in war-torn countries 
and societies. The argument behind this was that rule of law could contribute to the ends of 
peacebuilding by helping to establish stability and security in post-war or unstable societies, 
and prevent the emergence or re-emergence of violent conflict (Almeida & Krever, 2012). 
During this period, the United Nations started to use the liberal peace narrative in its defini-
tion of peacebuilding. In 2008, the UN defined peacebuilding as involving a wide range of 
activities that aim at reducing the risk of conflict by strengthening national capacities at all 
levels and addressing structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner, seek-
ing to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core 
functions (UN Peacekeeping operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008). For the UN, the 
achievement of a sustainable peace requires progress in at least four critical areas:  
 
• Restoring the State’s ability to provide security and maintain public order; 
• Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; 
• Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes; 
• Promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return or 
resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by conflict. 
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The liberal peacebuilding project therefore reflected the major change after the Cold War 
and the perceived triumph of liberal market democracy over Communism when Francis Fu-
kuyama proclaimed the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human governance; the only model of governance with any broad legitimacy and ideological 
appeal in the world (Paris, 2004) 
Statebuilding as Peacebuilding  
 
Due to the unprecedented executive authority of the United Nations in Kosovo and East 
Timor in 1999, the state assumed a more salient role in the theory and practice of peace-
building as the UN became the de facto state in these countries, revealing a need for new 
international civilian capacity to administer state functions during transitional periods. The 
experiences in Kosovo and East Timor opened a debate that was hastened by the US-led 
war in Afghanistan in 2001 and the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003-04. Peace-
building took a turn to a strong focus on constructing and strengthening legitimate govern-
mental institutions in countries emerging from civil war. The UN abandoned the value of 
neutrality and took on the responsibility to rebuild the administration and institutions in col-
lapsed states. During this period, statebuilding became a major component of peacebuild-
ing. The statebuilding model implemented replicated the institutions, norms, political, social, 
and economic systems of the Western system which also contributed to the ‘‘liberal peace-
building project’ definition.  
 
However, for some analysts, peacebuilding and statebuilding were not necessarily comfort-
ably matched and that there was an ‘uncomfortable compromise’ of liberal peacebuilding. 
For Richmond and Franks, the objectives of statebuilding differ to those of peacebuilding. 
While the statebuilding agenda is focussed on political, economic, and security architecture, 
and determines its outcomes as a neoliberal, sovereign and territorial state; peacebuilding 
focuses on the needs and rights of individuals, without placing sovereignty, territory and the 
institutions of the state ahead of the population needs (Richmond and Franks, 2011). The 
distinct agendas between peacebuilding and statebuilding can also be seen in the relation-
ship between top-down approaches targeting the state, and bottom-up approaches targeting 
civil society. The promotion and nurturing of civil society was widely perceived to be the 
most effective means of controlling state power, holding rulers accountable to their citizens 
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and promoting peace. Some analysts believe that in order to achieve sustainable peace the 
democratic relation between an accountable state and an active civil society is key 
(Philipsen, 2014). However, bottom-up approaches tended to be de-prioritised in the 
statebuilding agenda. The accountability of the interveners during statebuilding interventions 
was also questioned. In his book ‘Empire in Denial’, Chandler criticised the statebuilding 
approach for not being accountable and responsible. He argued that even when power has 
been exercised in a traditional way (such as an invasion or occupation as the US in Iraq and 
Afghanistan), Western institutions have ‘denied’ power and responsibility. And unlike direct 
forms of colonial rule, these new types of ‘Empires’ have exercised power without drawback 
of overt or transparent mechanisms of political accountability, increasingly undermining the 
traditional rights of state sovereignty, those of self-government and non-intervention (Chan-
dler, 2006a).  
Critiques of the Liberal Peace Project 
 
Using the division developed by Chandler (Chandler, 2011), the critiques of the liberal 
peacebuilding model can be grouped into two: the ‘power-based critique’ and the ‘ideas-
based critique’. The main difference between the two is that while the ‘ideas-based’ critique 
tend to seek to defend and legitimate regulatory external interventions, the ‘power-based’ 
critique tend to challenge and oppose these frameworks as the projection of Western power 
and interest. 
 
Power-based critique 
 
This critique argues that the liberal peacebuilding project reflects the hegemonic values and 
the political, economic and geo-strategic needs of Western states. Critiques focus on the 
role played by the interests of Western powers using interventions as an excuse to export 
Western ideologies to countries in which they are inappropriate (Chandler, 2011 & Ashdown, 
2008). This critics of the liberal peace do not argue that they are anti-liberal. On the contrary, 
they argue that liberalism, as projected in liberal peace frameworks, has to take into account 
the non-liberal context in which the intervention takes place. Therefore, the founding as-
sumptions of the liberal peace are the problem: attempts to universalise Western models in 
non-liberal contexts which will merely reproduce, and maybe even exacerbate, the problems 
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of conflict and instability. For instance, in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, the intervention was criticised as being used for imperialist objectives (and not 
for peaceful ones) as the US imposed elections, constitutional processes, market-oriented 
economic adjustment and institution-building. The main anti-intervention critique came from 
Herbst (2003) and Weinstein (2005) who objected to liberal interventionism and suggested 
that conflicts should sometimes be allowed to burn themselves out, and that large-scale 
impartial interventions (even after a ceasefire agreement) risks locking in conditions that are 
not sustainable or compatible with long term peace (in Ramsbotham et al, 2011). In other 
words, wars ending in military victory may produce longer-lasting peace than those ending 
in negotiated settlement. However, this approach involves huge risks and costs. For in-
stance, winners might decimate the losers (as in the case of Sri Lanka) or some wars might 
continue for years or decades without resolution (as in the case of the current conflict Syria).  
 
Also analysts questioned the sustainability of the interventions. According to Chandler, the 
solution to the complexity of the non-liberal state and society in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
was the internationalisation of the mechanisms of government, removing substantive auton-
omy rather than promoting it and not transforming institutions as part of the liberal peace 
(Chandler 2011). This was also exacerbated by the fact that although the roles played by 
non-Western regional organisations such as the African Union, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations or the Organisation of American States were considerable, most international 
conflict resolution procedures were led by either major international organisations or West-
ern countries in this period. Richmond and Franks (2011) also add that as the liberal peace 
is a discourse, framework and structure with a specific ontology and methodology, it oper-
ates both at a social and a state level with significant resources. But they argue that the 
allocation of those resources, the power to do so, and their control, has become the new 
site of power and domination in post-conflict societies (Richmond and Franks, 2011). This 
power imbalance has created relations of dependency between the external intervention 
and the local institutions. This has created situations where local institutions have been un-
dermined and peacebuilders have exercised such expansive powers that they could effec-
tively suppressed genuine political participation and locally driven reforms.  
 
Ideas-Based Critique 
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This critique is based on the grounding universalism assumptions of the liberal policy dis-
course itself, rather than merely as a critique of the forms of its implementation. These cri-
tiques advocate less liberal frameworks of intervention, with less attention to the reconstruc-
tion of sovereign states, democracy and free market and more focus on the problem of 
Western interventionist ‘ideas’ and ‘values’ rather than on interests or power relations (Chan-
dler, 2011). They critique the belief that any society anywhere in the world at any stage of 
social and economic development could be immediately transformed overnight into a liberal 
democracy. For instance, Krasner argues that sovereignty is problematic for many states 
because they lack the capacity for good governance and require an external regulatory 
framework in order to guarantee human rights and rule of law (in Chandler, 2011). Paris 
advocates for ‘Institutionalisation before Liberalisation’ (Paris, 2004) in order to establish the 
regulatory framework necessary to ensure that post-conflict societies can gradually and 
safely move towards liberal models of democracy. He claims that in post-conflict situations, 
economic and political liberalisation, while ultimately desirable, should be delayed until after 
the establishment of functioning governance institutions, such as the rule of law. Some an-
alysts even argued that not always being a democratic state necessarily means that the 
state is peaceful and that therefore it will prevent war. In her book, World on Fire, Amy Chua 
argues that there are cases in which democratisations released long-suppressed hatreds 
against a prosperous ethnic minority (such the ethnic cleansing of Croats in parts of the 
former Yugoslavia, the attacks of the Chinese minority in Indonesia, and the Tutsi slaughter 
in Rwanda). She argues that in the many countries that have pervasive poverty and a mar-
ket-dominant minority, democracy and markets can proceed only in deep tension with each 
other. In such conditions, the combined pursuit of free markets and democratisation has 
repeatedly catalysed ethnic conflict in highly predictable ways (Chua, 2002). Other short-
comings of the liberal peacebuilding project highlighted by Paris include: inadequate atten-
tion to domestic institutional conditions for successful democratisation and marketisation; 
poor strategic coordination among the various international actors involved in these mis-
sions; insufficient commitment to resources; limited knowledge of distinctive local conditions; 
insufficient local ownership over the strategic direction and daily activities of these opera-
tions; and continued conceptual challenges in defining the conditions for success and strat-
egies for bringing operations to an effective close (Paris, 2011). Campbell also raises the 
issue of accountability of peacebuilding organisations. He argues that peacebuilding organ-
isations should be accountable to the beneficiaries they claim to serve as opposed to actors 
that are external to the state in which they intervene (Campbell, 2011). 
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Nationally-owned Peacebuilding or Peacebuilding from below 
(2009-2014) 
 
In the late 2000s, new trends in peacebuilding began to produce different approaches as 
new voices from the global South demanded more nationally-owned processes. Many new 
actors based in emerging economies became more confident to assert their interests in 
different forums and contexts, including with respect to peacebuilding. This change led to 
different perspectives about ‘what’ peacebuilding might be at international or local levels, as 
well as about the ‘how’, ‘why’, and ‘who’ in peacebuilding. The troubled experiences of Af-
ghanistan and Iraq called into question even temporary assumptions of executive state 
power by international military or civilian missions, and challenged top-down approaches 
inspired by liberalism and externally-driven models and capacities. The dependence on 
‘Western support’ to implement the peacebuilding agenda, its linkages to neoliberalism, its 
focus on territorial sovereignty and statehood, and its inability to contextually address the 
needs of local populations were the target of much criticism. At the same time there was an 
increasing self-confidence amongst many state and societal actors that started challenging 
the approaches of outsiders attempting to control peacebuilding dynamics on the ground 
arguing that there was a disconnection between peacebuilding at the grassroots level and 
action by international organisations and bilateral donors (White Paper on Peacebuilding, 
Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2015). 
 
The peacebuilding from below approach was created based on the critiques that highlighted 
the need to develop a higher degree of understanding of national and local institutions and 
build cooperative relationships that enable national actors to sustain the desired results in 
order for liberal peacebuilders to achieve their transformative goals (Campbell, 2011). Sim-
ilarly, Hoffman describes ‘genuine peacebuilding’ as an ‘abandonment of uniform and bu-
reaucratically imposed structures, a far greater sensitivity and nuanced understanding of 
local conditions, and a readiness to encompass the variety of voices, often conflicting, that 
must participate if there is to be in inclusive collective reasoning about the peacebuilding 
project ‘(Hoffman, 2009 in Ramsbotham et al, 2011). In order to move from the previous top-
down liberal peacebuilding/statebuilding approach towards a participatory bottom-up ap-
proach, Hofman describes the process as follows: 
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“As a first step it would mean a move away from the paternalistic, technocratic one-
size-fits-all approach to peacebuilding. Shifting to a more bottom up, society building 
approach, there is a need to engage creatively and dynamically with local dynamics 
without falling into the trap of ‘romanticising the local’ or entrenching existing struc-
tures of violence and/or inequality. A peace that is built on the ground needs to reflect 
the interests, needs and aspirations of local populations rather than those of the 
international peacebuilding community. If we start by asking what ‘we’ want to 
achieve then we are starting with the wrong question” (in Ramsbotham et al, 2011, 
page 227) 
 
In order to address the lack of contextualisation and ownership of the interventions, many 
scholars (Duffield, 2007, Richmond 2007 & Pugh, 2005 in Paris, 2011b) started to look at 
how the liberal peacebuilding theory could evolve and take into account these issues. Still 
rooted on the liberal peacebuilding approach and principles, different approaches for the 
same model were developed: 
Emancipatory Peacebuilding 
 
The concept of ‘Emancipatory Peacebuilding’ was brought up in order to achieve a broad 
consensus among the target population by ensuring participation of local actors and more 
engagement with local populations (Pugh, 2005 in Paris, 2011b). However, this concept was 
criticised for not being specific enough as it did not provide a clear alternative approach to 
liberal peacebuilding, with some proponents not even viewing it as distinct model from liberal 
peacebuilding (Paris, 2011b). For instance, Richmond argues that emancipatory peace-
building is not distinct enough from liberal peacebuilding as emancipation is integral to lib-
eralism but current approaches do not put enough weight and emphasis on bottom up ap-
proaches. Moreover, both Richmond and Paris agree that liberal peacebuilding cannot suc-
ceed unless it achieves a broad consensus among its target population which might in turn 
be connected to the idea of emancipation (Richmond, 2007 & Paris, 2011b). 
Local Liberal hybrid form 
 
This approach considers that in order to make peace sustainable there needs to be greater 
cultural sensitivity and local ownership and a focus on the agency, rights, needs and welfare 
of the communities and individuals concerned rather than on overly securitised institutions 
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and states. According to Richmond, a local-liberal hybrid form of peace constitutes a post-
liberal forms of peace and represents the interface between the local and the liberal and 
rather than imposing the liberal normative system on the local. As such, it should facilitate a 
new mediation between the two in each context (Richmond, 2011b). This model argues that 
sustainable peacemaking processes must be based not merely on the peace agreements 
made by elites, but rather, on the empowerment of communities torn apart by war. It there-
fore recognises the importance of local actors, local knowledge and wisdom, the non-gov-
ernmental sector and citizen-based peacebuilding initiatives. It is also designed to capitalise 
on the core of the original conflict resolution and peacebuilding agendas, addressing needs 
and root causes, connecting the new liberal state or polity with older, locally recognisable 
and contextual, customary, political, social and economic traditions, and engaging with 
grass roots and the most marginalised members of post-conflict polities. This model also 
recognises that the interaction and mediation between the local and the international liberal 
aspects could result in cooperation, as it is as likely that the local will shape the liberal in 
each context as the liberal will shape the local (Ramsbotham et al, 2011 & Richmond, 
2011b). 
 
Mac Ginty also agrees that hybridity is a way of capturing the interaction between internal 
and external actors in contexts experiencing internationally sponsored peacebuilding and 
statebuilding operations and that is in tune with the conflict transformation literature that 
encourages us to examine relationships between actors, and questions the fixity of identities 
and world views (Mac Ginty, 2011). For Mac Ginty, the purpose of hybridity is to propose a 
more accurate view of the dynamic and multifarious nature of actors, ideas and practices 
that contribute to peacebuilding which involves local actors pushing back against interna-
tional peace interventions and creating and maintaining their own space for political, eco-
nomic and cultural interaction which has largely been removed from the agendas and re-
source streams created by liberal peace actors. He argues that traditional and indigenous 
methods tend to focus on ‘consensus decision making’, a restoration of the human/resource 
balance and compensations designed to ensure reciprocal and ongoing harmonious rela-
tions between groups which has the potential to achieve grass root legitimacy of peacebuild-
ing interventions. However, he argues that even if hybridity is a way to bring the local back 
to the studies it is important not to romantise all local, traditional and customary things or 
the sense that the most effective and sustainable ways of finding peace can only be known 
and experience by indigenous peoples unaided by external interference Hybrid Peace as 
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traditional practices might reinforce the authority of existing power holders and to impose 
social conformity. Nevertheless, without clear alternatives to the liberal project, Mac Ginty 
believes that hybridity remains the most sensible foundation for post-conflict peacebuilding 
(Mac Ginty, 2011) 
Support of National Dialogue and Peace Processes  
 
National dialogue processes offer domestic frameworks for negotiating political settlements 
and facilitating constitutional reform, which external partners can support. Domestic actors 
lead the process, decision-making and means of implementation, and national dialogues 
bring together major policymakers and social stakeholders. Dialogue structures have not 
only provided new constitutional frameworks to address the root causes of conflict or con-
stitutional failures, but have also served a much broader function: to provide spaces and 
instruments for reconciliation, developing joint visions between former enemies, and slowly 
evolving an understanding of the needs, perceptions and perspectives of the “other” 
(Siebert, 2014). 
 
One function of a peace process can be understood as providing a structure to accommo-
date diverse or competing sources of, or claimants to, legitimacy in conflict-affected states 
and societies, and to cultivate broad consent on a satisfactory way forward for peace. The 
legitimacy of a peace process can be understood as the extent of popular support both for 
the process itself – its specific initiatives and components – and for its outcomes, including 
a peace deal or political settlement. Ramsbotham and Wennmann argue that applying ‘le-
gitimacy lens’ in the design and implementation to efforts in building peace and transform 
government can be useful to enhance the prospects of sustainable peace. This can be done 
by prioritising the following (Ramsbotham and Wennmann, 2014):  
 
Context: recognising that legitimacy is specific to the circumstances and constituencies of a 
given conflict. Context-sensitive peacebuilding stresses domestic ownership of the peace 
agenda and architecture. 
Consent: acknowledging that legitimacy is contested in situations of violent conflict. A con-
sensual peace process that can accommodate representation of multiple sources of legiti-
macy is more likely to lead to a consensual outcome that people will commit to. 
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Change: understanding that peace initiatives are best seen as key components in ongoing 
processes of transition, rather than as ends in themselves. In states and societies affected 
by violent conflict, peace processes can help facilitate progress towards more consensual 
systems of governance as the basis for promoting sustainable peace. 
 
However, the report of the UN peacebuilding architecture review in 2015 (United Nations, 
2015), analyses some of the complexities with supporting national peace processes in the 
current evolving conflict environment. The report argues that from the perspective of sus-
taining peace the old model of ending a conflict through a comprehensive peace accord 
between previous fairly well identified enemies has often had to give way to less tidy ar-
rangements with less clearly defined protagonists. This is turn greatly increases the risk of 
relapse. Peace agreements are often hurried and the processes frequently influenced or 
driven by outside mediation groups with varying levels of international legitimacy. Much as 
peace cannot be imposed from outside, the report argues that peace cannot simply be im-
posed by domestic elites or authoritarian governments on fractious populations that lack 
even minimal trust in their leaderships or each other and that in divided post-conflict socie-
ties such an approach risks perpetuating exclusion (United Nations, 2015). 
 
Is the Liberal Peace Project in Crisis? Alternative models 
 
There has been many debates and discussions as to whether the liberal peacebuilding pro-
ject is in crisis or not. Regardless of the outcomes of those discussions, data has proved 
that the liberal peace model still remains relevant today in order to analyse contemporary 
conflicts and peace processes. In 2014, Madhav, Sung Yong & Mac Ginty conducted and 
study which they analysed the data from the Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) project which com-
pares and contrasts the features of comprehensive peace agreements signed since 1989. 
The PAM dataset identified 34 comprehensive peace accords after intra-state conflict in 31 
countries, with 25 peace accords (74 per cent) involving external mediation support either 
by international organisations or international/regional players. By looking at five liberal pol-
icy areas (promotion of democracy, rule of law, and emphasis on human rights, security 
sector reform, government reforms), the PAM data prove that the liberal peace does indeed 
exist, at least in terms of the inclusion of liberal goals in the text of peace accords. All five 
elements were found in over 50 per cent of peace accords, with some elements (especially 
security sector reform and electoral and political reform) found in a much higher percentage. 
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The study concluded that liberal peacebuilding is still a dominant form of internationally sup-
ported peacemaking, and argued that the influence of liberalism has done much to shape 
contemporary peacebuilding operations (Madhav et al, 2014) 
 
The debate and evolution around the definition, characteristics and scope of peacebuilding 
will continue to evolve, and this debate would continue to consider the views from different 
actors. As stated in to Ramsbotham et al ‘peacebuilding should reflect and be the product 
of a negotiated discursive practice and not the outcome of a technically defined and exter-
nally imposed blueprint’ (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Nevertheless, as examined before, there 
has not been an alternative peacebuilding model that is not rooted in western liberal princi-
ples. All the alternative approaches are based on the liberal model and principles and many 
analysts believe that the liberal peacebuilding model should not be replace, rather, it should 
be revised under the same principles. For instance, for scholars like Paris, the solution is 
not to replace liberal peacebuilding but to reform existing approaches within a broadly liberal 
framework (Paris, 2011b). Richmond and Franks also argue that there is a need to develop 
a praxis of post-liberal peacebuilding that will be designed to capitalise on the core of the 
original conflict resolution and peacebuilding agendas: addressing the needs and root 
causes of the conflict, connecting the new liberal state or polity with older, locally recognisa-
ble and contextual, customary, political, social and economic traditions, and engaging with 
grass roots and the most marginalised members of post-conflict societies (Richmond and 
Franks, 2011).  
 
However, the field of peacebuilding (and conflict resolution) remains essentially a Western 
field dominated by Western academia and schools of thoughts. In the case of peacebuilding, 
there is not a clear alternative to liberal peacebuilding that is not rooted on Western liberal 
principles. And none of the alternative approaches to peacebuilding have taken into account 
non-Western approaches to this field. This has created critiques amongst non-Western 
scholars who believe that ‘western’ assumptions on which conflict resolution rest are not 
applicable universally’ (Salem, in Ramsbotham et al, 2011). In response Woodhouse argued 
that although most of the conflict resolution theories and practices have been articulated in 
the West, their deep roots and principles reach into far older world traditions from which they 
draw their inspiration (Woodhouse in Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Finding ways to enrich west-
ern and non-western traditions on conflict resolution lies at the heart of cosmopolitan conflict 
resolution.  
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In order to examine non-western approaches to peacebuilding that could contribute to cos-
mopolitan conflict resolution, the next chapter is going to examine the Chinese approach to 
peacebuilding. As it will illustrate, the principles around the Chinese approach, although 
based on Confucianism and other Chinese philosophies, have similar (or non-conflicting) 
values to those in the Western world and therefore they could contribute to enriching the 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding debate and evolution. As stated by Ramsbotham et al, 
if the central goal of transforming potential violence into non-violent change is not shared 
cross-culturally, then there is no international, let alone cosmopolitan, conflict resolution field 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2011). 
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Chapter Three: The Chinese Approach to Peacebuilding 
 
 
 
‘To end poverty, build a road’  
Chinese Saying 
 
China believes that poverty is the root cause of many of today’s conflicts, including terrorism, 
and therefore it considers economic growth as a political imperative to prevent social conflict 
and unrest. This belief is part of China’s foreign policy discourse and has been stressed by 
Chinese scholars and officials who frequently point to underdevelopment as a root cause of 
conflict. Peace and stability is a critical factor for economic development and therefore China 
has also strongly advocated and used concepts such as ‘peace’, ‘stability’ and ‘develop-
ment’ in their foreign policy discourse promoting China’s role as a responsible great power. 
According to Chinese scholars, measures such as reducing poverty and resolving unem-
ployment problems should be the most important tasks when approaching conflict and se-
curity issues in conflict affected countries and development should be the cornerstone in the 
process of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Lei, in Saferworld, 2011). 
But how does China define its approach for peacebuilding? And where is this approach 
coming from? 
 
This chapter is going to examine first the main characteristics of the Chinese peacebuilding 
approach. It will then look at some of the historical and philosophical influences that have 
impacted the peacebuilding approach as well as some of the unique characteristics of the 
Chinese state. The domestic situation will then be analysed by proving an overview of some 
of the key social issues that are emerging in China in the post-reform era. Finally, in order 
to examine how China has implemented its Chinese peacebuilding approach at home, this 
chapter will look at the ethnic conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang, going into more detail on the 
later example to analyse some of the successes and challenges of the approach.  
 
 
Characteristics of the Chinese Peacebuilding Approach 
 
Although China does not have a specific peacebuilding policy, it has developed a distinct 
and unique approach to peacebuilding informed by its own experience, culture, its internal 
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conflicts in Xinjiang and Tibet and its growing influence in conflict-affected states. China 
bases it approach on the idea of ‘developmental peace or peace through development’ 
(Xuejun, 2014), a thesis that believes that social and economic development is a fundamen-
tal way to sustainable domestic peace. The Chinese peacebuilding approach also places 
emphasis on gradual political and social reform and strengthening of national sovereignty in 
the process of advancing political and economic development. Overall, the Chinese Peace-
building approach has three main distinct characteristics: 
 
1. Focus on Economic development: The Chinese government considers rapid economic 
growth a political imperative to prevent massive unemployment, labour unrest and social 
conflict. Although economic development and social cohesion have been central to the 
role of the state in Chinese history, it was Den Xiaoping policy of ‘tao guang yang hui’ 
(translated as ‘bide our time and build our capabilities’) one of the first explicit economic 
development policies of the reform era (Leonard, 2008). This policy meant that China, 
as a poor and weak country, should avoid conflicts and concentrate on economic devel-
opment. Since then, the government has based its economic policies on an algorithm 
derived from its priority on stability: keeping the economic growth by at least seven per-
cent is considered a political imperative to create jobs and prevent the widespread un-
employment that could lead to large-scale unrest and social conflict (Shirk, 2008). 
 
2. Strong Government: China’s approach to peacebuilding takes a heavily state-centric 
view promoting the idea of ‘strong government’ that will drive economic development. 
According to Chinese scholars, any peacebuilding work should focus on enhancing the 
concerned country’s state capacity instead of weakening its leadership (Lei, 2010). In 
the international cooperation system, this means direct government-to-government sup-
port to strengthen the state capacity and capability. In contrast with the Washington 
Consensus, this approach rejects ‘shock therapy’ (introducing market and trade liberal-
isation oriented policies usually including large-scale privatisation of previously public-
owned assets) and the big bang (the sudden deregulation of financial markets that was 
the cornerstone of Margaret Thatcher’s government in the 1980s) in favour of a process 
of gradual reform based on working through existing institutions with the purpose of cre-
ating a strong developmental state capable of steering and leading the process of reform 
(Jacques, 2012a).  
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3. Focus on Conflict Prevention: In his farewell address when he concluded his term as 
premier in 2013, Zhu Rongji emphasised social stability and called on officials to ‘deal 
correctly with inner conflicts among the people in the same situation, deal appropriately 
with sudden collective incidents, and work hard to resolve grass-roots conflicts and dis-
putes to nip them in the bud’ (in Shirk, 2008, page 8). China’s peacebuilding approach 
puts a heavy emphasis on conflict prevention and mitigation in order to maintain order 
and social stability which are essential pre-requisites to achieve economic development. 
This characteristic is heavily informed by Confucianism and the ‘harmonious society’ 
concept that stresses unity, cohesion and stability as the main features on an ideal so-
ciety. In the international arena, this has translated in China’s preference for the non-
military means of persuasion and negotiation and advocating   for a more crucial role for 
dialogue and the power of the example in preventing the negative consequences of 
power politics, such as the use of force. In other words, Beijing promotes a slow process 
of continuous dialogue that focuses on managing conflict and on introducing techniques 
of conflict management based on governmental consent (Odgaard, 2012).  
 
The Chinese Peacebuilding approach is informed by the principles of mutual sovereignty 
and non-intervention in domestic affairs. Beijing maintains that national governments alone 
should focus on and respond to matters related to domestic political, economic or social 
affairs – including internal conflict. China’s adherence to strict Westphalian norms derives 
from its colonial past and experience of foreign domination. China’s loss of sovereignty and 
independence between 1839 and 1949 (known as the ‘hundred years of humiliation) was 
the underlying reference point for much of the Chinese discourse on this matter. The con-
cern on sovereignty was propelled during the twentieth century by China’s claim that the 
West sought to split China by recognising Taiwan or encouraging Tibet’s independence. 
This stance also reflects nation and state-building concerns stemming from confronting an 
immense population, the imperatives of economic development, and the maintenance of 
social cohesion in the presence of separatist movements on Chinese territory itself. How-
ever, since the reform period, Chinese views on sovereignty and intervention have shown 
signs of greater flexibility and pragmatism. This is due to two main factors: First, China’s 
domestic concerns with ethnic unrest and separatism, especially in the Eastern province of 
Xinjiang, helped lead Beijing to adopt a more flexible policy towards sovereignty and inter-
vention since it concerns counterterrorism and requires an international approach. Beijing 
was particular concern about the domestic implications of Islamic radicalism emerging in 
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Afghanistan as well as ethnic separatism in other parts of central and South Asia, fearing its 
spread into China (Gill, 2010). In supporting the US-led war on terrorism, Beijing softened 
past positions on sovereignty in order to gain greater international and regional support for 
its efforts to quell potential unrest and terrorism along its Central Asian borders. Secondly, 
there is an internal debate in China around whether the country should be more proactive 
on its foreign policy or not. There is an emerging view amongst some Chinese analysts who 
believe that traditional notions of state sovereignty should be made subordinate to advanc-
ing China’s overall national interests which required at least some level of cooperation with 
international society (Carlson, 2011). In recent years there have increasing examples of 
what has been labelled as “creative involvement” policies (Yizhou, 2012) where China has 
taken a complete U-turn on the principle of non-interference and decided to intervene in a 
conflict (the characteristics of the creative involvement policies will be looked in more detail 
in chapter four). Examples where Beijing has been galvanised to act include: mediator role 
between Sudan and South Sudan, shuttle diplomacy between India and Pakistan and inter-
vention and mediation in the conflict in Kachin, Myanmar, which will be examined in more 
detail in chapter five.  
 
A “Civilisation State” - Influences of the Chinese Peacebuilding Ap-
proach 
 
The Chinese peacebuilding approach is based on the country’s own experience of economic 
development. China has borne witness to the greatest poverty-reduction program ever seen, 
with the number of people living in poverty falling from 250 million at the start of the reform 
process in 1978 to 80 million by the end of 1993, 29.27 million in 2001 and 26 million in 
2007, thereby accounting for three quarters of global poverty reduction during this period 
(Jacques, 2012a, page 186). The Chinese approach is also based on the unique character-
istics of the Chinese state as the guardian of social cohesion and stability. In Chinese his-
tory, if the state failed to develop the economy and improve people’s living standards or 
cope with major natural calamities, it would lose the hearts and minds of the people and 
hence lose the ‘mandate of heaven’. For instance, in the period of Imperial China, the gov-
ernment transported bulk commodities (grain, salt, copper etc.) over long distances since 
these were crucial for maintaining the stability, cohesion and subsistence of the population. 
The priorities of the imperial state tended to be focussed on the maintenance of order and 
balance development rather than narrow profit-making and industrialisation. Based on these 
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influences, China’s approach to development and governance is that of pragmatism: a com-
mitment to doing whatever it takes to promote growth while maintaining political stability, 
itself a prerequisite for economic development (Ying, 2011) 
A civilisation state and the role of Confucianism  
 
A major underlying factor influencing China’s involvement in the world is its sense of itself 
as a civilisation. With its five thousand years of history, huge geographic and demographic 
scale and diversity, China has been defined as the only “civilisation state” (Jacques, 2012a).  
Unlike in Western countries where national identity has in great part been shaped by their 
history as nation-states, Chinese identity is described as a product of its civilisation history. 
The uniqueness of the Chinese civilisation state is characterised by a large population, vast 
territory, long traditions, rich culture, unique language, unique politics, unique society and a 
unique economy (Weiwei, 2012). The longevity of the Chinese civilisation has engendered 
a strong sense of unity and common identity, a process that has included mixing, melding, 
absorption and assimilation of a multitude of diverse races. As described by Lucien Pye 
‘what binds the Chinese together is their sense of culture, race, and civilisation, not an iden-
tification with the nation state’ (Pye, L. in Jacques, 2012a, page 247). The concrete uses of 
history in China are part of the present Chinese condition; they both reflect and create the 
present. These historical references are shaped by present day circumstances and help 
construct a particular picture of the present. For instance, its experiences and memory of 
the ‘century of humiliation’ inform much of the current Chinese popular nationalism (Bara-
bantseva, 2011). This has profound implications to understand the behaviour and character 
of the Chinese state as its main priority is to ensure unity and plurality as the condition of its 
existence. 
 
Since the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square, there has been a noticeable departure from 
Marxist ideology in favour of the popularisation of Confucian values in public and official 
discourse in China. Some Chinese analysts argue that the revival of Confucianism as ortho-
dox ideology is one of the main tasks for the Chinese leadership in the twenty-first century 
in order to nurture and strength the national spirit and unite the nation (Barabantseva, 2011). 
Particularly in the domains of culture, morality, education and other means of solidifying 
national cohesion, the role of the Chinese ‘tradition’ has been affirmed.  Confucian thought 
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has traditionally dominated Chinese culture and behaviours and has set the basis of Chi-
nese government and society for more than two thousand years. Confucian rule is not per-
ceived as an expression of divine authority but is rather based on the idea of an ethical 
order, an understanding of how society should be ordered, including behaviour and action. 
Confucius lived during the Warring States Period and the experience of living in a moment 
of turbulence and instability in a divided country informed his principles of overriding priority 
of stability and unity. These values as well as the emphasis on moral virtue have informed 
and shaped the Chinese civilisation ever since rulers were required to govern in accordance 
with the teachings of Confucius and were expected to set the highest moral standards. 
 
Confucius believed that war between states is the most violent conflict, the main cause of 
miseries and the chief destroyer of social harmony. To stop war, Confucians masters ex-
plored ways to reduce conflicts of interests between states, and sought to bring peace and 
harmony to the world by means of moral influence and the power of virtue (Yao, 2000). 
Confucians were not pacifists in the strictest sense. The reality of wars forced them to seek 
effective ways to end war, and the conception of ‘just war’, a war which is waged by right-
eous people, for good causes and for punishing the tyranny and consoling the people, was 
upheld (Yao, 2000). However, Confucius was more in favour of influencing through virtue 
and not through violence. Confucius' answer to the conflicts of his era was the ‘Way’ of the 
just and harmonious society (Kissinger, 2011). His philosophy sought the redemption of the 
state through righteous individual behaviour. This stress on unity, stability, cohesion and 
solidarity has been a constant feature in Confucian societies. However, harmony and mod-
eration do not necessarily mean complacency and passivity; rather they refer more to ‘seek-
ing common ground while reserving differences’ and to achieving what Confucius called 
‘harmony in diversity’ (Weiwei, 2012). The concept of ‘harmony in diversity’ is often the goal 
of an ideal society, as this society will encapsulate the three harmonies: person’s internal 
harmony, harmony among humans and harmony between humans and nature (Weiwei, 
2012). Similarly, the Philosophy of Xunzi also believed that conflict is inevitable and that 
human nature incline naturally towards evil, therefore competing for selfish interests is a 
natural phenomenon that leads inevitable to violent conflict. He also believed that man’s evil 
nature is the root cause of international conflict: ‘if in seeking to satisfy their desires men 
observe no measure and apportion things without limits, then it would be impossible for them 
not to contend over the means to satisfy their desire. Such contention leads to disorder. 
Disorder leads to poverty’ (in Xuetong, 2011) 
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The role and characteristics of the Chinese state  
 
“There is no Chinese institution that is more distinctive – or indigenous – than the Chinese 
state” (Jacques, 2012b). For the Chinese the state is seen as a natural and intrinsic part of 
the society. It is regarded not in a narrowly political way, but more broadly as a source of 
meaning, moral behaviour and order. The Confucian concept of a harmonious society is 
based on a role-based system of ethics, in which the governed and the governors respect 
and protect each other’s place. The ruled are subservient to the ruler, but only because the 
ruler fulfils the important duties of ensuring livelihood, shelter, education, and security from 
foreign invasion (Halper, 2010). During Imperial China, the Chinese mandate of Heaven 
established moral criteria for holding powers, which enable the Chinese to distance them-
selves from their rulers and to speculate on their virtue and sustainability (which differs from 
the Western’s ruler accession to monarchy which rested solely on birth). A succession of 
bad harvests, or growing poverty might bring into question the right of a particular emperor 
to continue his role which could in turn lead to and sustain huge popular uprisings. Moreover, 
in Confucian East Asian societies political associations are themselves seen as being 
properly modelled after the family and the clan, hence participants are expected to act as 
though they are bound together in a blood relationship (Pye, 1985). For all these reasons, 
China has developed an institution that has very different characteristics to that of the West-
ern model. Some of this characteristics that distinguish the Chinese state from any Western 
institution include the following: 
 
Unity and cohesion as the central role of the state: The Confucian legacy in China meant 
that the ultimate values of government were stability, continuity, and harmonious relations 
among all members. Throughout its history, Chinese governments have been deeply pre-
occupied with stability and unity because ruling such a vast country has always been a 
hugely difficult act of governance requiring attentiveness to the causes and sources of op-
position. According to Jacques, the Chinese commitment to unity has three dimensions: the 
fundamental priority attached to unity by both the state and the people; the central role ex-
pected of the state in ensuring that this unity is maintained; and a powerful sense of a com-
mon Chinese identity that underpins this overarching popular commitment to unity (Jacques, 
2012a). This civic agreement between the state and its citizens reflect important aspects of 
the China model today: the ruling elites ensure quality of life and cohesion, in return, the 
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people let them retain their monopoly on political power.  As demonstrated by President Hu 
Jintao in his speech at the Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2007 (in Kerr, 2011): 
 
‘We must reinforce unity, take heed of the overall situation, conscientiously safe-
guard the integrity and unity of the whole Party, preserve the organic relations be-
tween the Party and masses, consolidate the great unity of the ethnic peoples of the 
whole country, strengthen the great unity of the sons and daughters of the Chinese 
nation at home and overseas, promote the great unity of the Chinese people with 
the people of all countries of the world, in order to provide the immense power to 
overcome all difficulties and obstructions and propel the cause of the party and peo-
ple toward new and greater triumphs’   
 
Legitimacy of the government through a non-democratic system: Ever since Confucius, the 
Chinese state has been perceived as the embodiment and guardian of Chinese civilisation 
and responsible for maintaining its unity which is why it has enjoyed such huge authority 
and legitimacy even though not a single vote is cast for the government (Weiwei, 2012). 
This claim around the legitimacy of the Chinese state was also reinforced by a survey con-
ducted by Tony Saich of Harvard’s Kennedy School in 2009 that showed that no less than 
95.9 per cent of Chinese were either relatively or extremely satisfied with the central gov-
ernment - although this figure fell to 61.5 per cent at the local level (Jacques, 2012a). These 
figures indicate a high level of satisfaction even in the absence of a western-style democratic 
system. This evidence suggests that democracy is not the only one determinant of a state’s 
legitimacy. Weiwei and Jacques believes that the reason behind this lies in some of the 
unique characteristics of the Chinese state and the fact that its authority derives from an 
entirely different source: its role as the protector, guardian and embodiment of Chinese civ-
ilisation (Weiwei, 2012 and Jacques, 2012a). Moreover, the Chinese perceive the state dif-
ferently from westerners. According to Jacques, westerners perceive the state as an out-
sider, an interloper, or even a necessary evil that must be constantly held to account and 
justified. The Chinese, on the other hand, view the state as an intimate, as part of the family, 
even as the head of the family (Jacques, 2012a).  
 
Different historical evolutions and values: The historical evolution and construction of the 
Chinese state also differs from that of any western state. In China, the state acquired a 
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modernised form, with a centralised administration recruited by means of the imperial ex-
amination system that was capable of governing a vast country, long before this was the 
case in Europe; and developed a range of powers over the economy, population and the 
military, such as the capacity to move grain around the country and undertake huge infra-
structural projects, again much earlier than Europe (Jacques, 2012b). China was never en-
gaged in sustained contact with another country on the basis of equality for the simple rea-
son that it never encountered societies of comparable culture or magnitude. However, 
throughout its history, the Chinese state never espoused the American notion of universal-
ism to spread its values around the world (Kissinger, 2011). 
 
Illiberal characteristics: In the Confucian view, the exclusion of the people from government 
was regarded as a positive virtue, allowing the government officials to be responsive to the 
ethics and ideals with which they had been inculcated. This view entailed that all power 
should emanate from above, from the centre, and from a single supreme leader (Pye, 1985). 
This centralisation of power was made easier by the strong sense of racial identity, in spite 
of linguistic and cultural differences, and the overriding sense that the Chines have of their 
common racial roots. However, this characteristic of the Chinese state prevented the devel-
opment of any type of western-style civil society organisations either in the Confucian period 
or more recently in the Communist period (Jacques, 2012b). Bu on the other hand, the lack 
of a democratic system has allowed the state to develop an ability to think and act in ways 
that address the long term issues.  
 
All of these characteristics inform the way China sees peace as well as the role that the 
state should play in it in order to achieve social stability and unity. The next section is going 
to look at the domestic situation and the internal conflicts in China as another factor that 
have influenced the Chinese peacebuilding approach.  
 
China’s internal conflicts: the origins of the Chinese Peacebuilding 
Approach 
 
Currently there are a varied and wide-ranging social issues in China, which are a combined 
result of the Chinese economic reforms that started in the late 1970s, China’s political and 
cultural history and its vast population. These issues impact and influence the Chinese 
peacebuilding approach as well as its foreign policy. The following section is going to exam-
ine in more details some of these social issues. The first part will look at social conflict in 
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China and some of the social issues derived from the rapid economic growth. The second 
section will explore ethnic conflict in China with a deeper analysis on the situation in Xinjiang 
and how the Chinese government has implemented its peacebuilding approach in its West-
ern region.  
Social conflict in China  
 
There is limited research on social conflict in China. With ‘an overriding need for stability’ 
and ‘a harmonious society’ as the official policy lines, the potential negative social and po-
litical impacts of social conflict make it a highly sensitive topic in China (Jianrong, 2007). 
Chinese academics tend to stay away from the subject resulting in a lack of in-depth and 
systematic research on social conflict in China and its root causes. From the limited existing 
research, it seems that most of the social conflict in China is related to the economic reforms 
and the widening gap between rich and poor and between the rural and urban areas. The 
current social issues that already have or could in the future deteriorate into social unrest 
can be grouped in the following categories: 
 
Inequality 
 
Rapid urbanisation and modernisation has widening the income gap which could cause de-
stabilisation of the society as well as social unrest. The gap between the rich and poor has 
widened during the reform era: the richest 10 percent hold 45 percent of the country’s 
wealth, and the poorest 10 percent have only 1.4 percent (in Shirk, 2008, page 30). Also, 
people in China’s richest areas make twice as much as residents of the five poorest areas. 
The impact and consequences of growing inequality have already been acknowledged by 
the Chinese government. Ma Kai, China’s top economic planner, said in 2004: ‘the widening 
wealth gap caused as cities and coastal areas race ahead of the hinterland could spark 
social unrest and undermine the government’s authority over the country’s 1.3 billion people’ 
(in Shirk, 2008, page 31). Even if Premier Wen Jiabao in 2006 promised ‘to pay attention to 
maintaining social equality and give priority to issues concerning the immediate interests of 
the people’ (in Shirk, 2008, page 30) demonstrations by laid-off workers, dissatisfied farm-
ers, urban migrants, and ethnic minorities have become an everyday occurrence in China.  
Rural Unrest 
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In Chinese society today, large-scale conflicts are most likely to erupt in rural rather than in 
urban areas. This is mainly due to the growing inequality. In the past ten years, China has 
experienced a rapid period of transition from a planned to a market economy and in the 
process, farmers’ economic interests have grown far more slowly than the national average. 
This widening ‘wealth gap’ has made social justice a focal issue for resentful peasants and 
rural unrest has spread and grown in scale (Jianrong, 2007). Land seizures and environment 
pollution are the two issues that are driving farmers to violent action. Some Chinese scholars 
argue that even acknowledging that the urban-rural gap in China is quite large, the Chinese 
rural areas have also undergone an enormous transformation over the past three decades, 
though smaller in scale than the cities. For instance, life span in the Chinese rural areas has 
increased to around seventy years, most people live in brick-built houses and 82% of the 
population in Tibet (China’s least developed and most monotonous region) have access to 
electricity (Weiwei, 2012, page 32-33). Nevertheless, as the situation has deteriorated in the 
last years with more incidents reported, it has attracted more notice from journalists and the 
central government as the peasants’ direct confrontation of local governments has shaken 
the foundations of the Chinese state (Jianrong, 2007).  
 
Land disputes 
 
Peasant interests have also been gravely impacted by the huge tide of land appropriation in 
recent years: there were an estimated 180,000 mass protest incidents in China in 2011 and 
more than 60% had to do with land disputes (Jianrong, 2007). Rapidly developmental 
coastal provinces are the site of most of the clashes over land seizures. China has a socialist 
system of land ownership, where land is either owned by the state or collectively owned by 
the working masses. Peasant farmers do not own land and are entitled only the right to use 
land. With the high economic growth and rapid urbanisation, a large amount of farm land 
has been expropriated, particularly in rural areas bordering big cities. As the government is 
technically both owner of the land and administer of its use (and often a developer itself), 
the appropriation of land is not supervised, resulting in frequent abuse which leads to fre-
quent unrest (Jianrong, 2007). 
Ethnic Unrest in the Western Border Regions    
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Even if social conflict is getting more attention from the central government, the main source 
of tension and conflict in China is carried out by ethnic and religious minorities in the Western 
border regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.  Tibet and Xinjiang together account for around on-
third of China’s territory and both are strategically important border regions. The Tibetan and 
the Uighur are both ethnically and racially different from the Han Chinese and both regions 
shared a similar history with the rest of China. When the Communist party seized power in 
1949, substantial regions had broken away from the historic Chinese Empire, notably Tibet, 
parts of Xinjiang, parts of Mongolia, and the border areas of Myanmar. Mao, like several 
founders of dynasties before him, claimed the frontiers of China that the empire had estab-
lished at its maximum historic extent. As soon as the civil war ended, Mao set out to reoc-
cupy the secessionists regions, such as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and eventually Tibet. Since 
then, the Chinese government has partially implemented its peacebuilding approach of fo-
cus on economic development to address poverty and also in order to win acceptance of 
the population and ensure social stability in the regions.  
 
Tibet 
 
The conflict over Tibet’s status has been a conflict over history (Sperling, 2004). China main-
tains that Tibet is an inalienable part of China and Tibetans maintain that Tibet has histori-
cally been an independent country.  When China’s last dynasty, the Qing, collapsed in 1911, 
Tibet emerged as a de facto independent state but that independence was not recognised 
by China or acknowledged by Britain, India or any other state. Tibet’s de facto independence 
came to an end in 1949 with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the 
region was incorporated into China through an agreement signed in 1951. Subsequent dec-
ades witnessed the implementation of radically different and contradictory Chinese policies 
in the Tibetan Plateau which have serve to exacerbate the Sino-Tibetan relations. On one 
hand, these policies included the establishment of the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 1965; 
the attempt to suppress a separate Tibetan identity in the 1960s and 1970s; and repression 
of separatists’ tendencies and allegiance to the Dalai Lama in the 1990s (including refusing 
to recognise the Dalai Lama, restricting the role of the Buddhist priests and forbidding Ti-
betan students and government workers from visiting monasteries or participating in reli-
gious ceremonies). On the other hand, China made a major effort to generate economic 
growth and raise living standards in the belief that this would help win the acceptance of 
Tibetans. Beijing’s plan was to solidify its position in Tibet by investing substantial funds into 
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development (which includes a target of 10% economic growth per annum and a doubling 
of average income per decade) rather than by making concessions on ethnic sensibilities 
(Goldstein,1995). The economic plan has been successful and development standards have 
improved. Since 1950, Tibetan living standards and life expectancy have been transformed, 
with annual economic growth averaging 12 per cent and incomes raising by more than 10 
per cent annually (Jacques, 2012a, page 319). According to Goldstein, through these poli-
cies, Beijing is hoping on a process of ‘acculturation’ in which the Han Chinese will open up 
Tibetans to new ideas and attitudes and a create a new ‘modern’ Tibetan in the process who 
will not be so influence by religion and lamas (Goldstein, 1995). Moreover, though the im-
provements and investment on the education system, Beijing is also trying to create a mod-
ern and better educated Tibetan elite.  
 
However, in order to achieve this economic growth, China has allowed non-Tibetans to do 
business in Tibet and encouraged large scale Han migration to Tibet. This influx has resulted 
in non-Tibetans controlling a large segment of the local economy at all levels, from ‘street 
corner bicycle repairmen to electronic goods store owners, to firms trading with the rest of 
China’ (Goldstein,1995). Despite this definite increased in Han migration to Tibet, such mi-
gration is not stable as migrants do not tend to settle in the long term and just stay in the 
area to complete infrastructure projects. These non-Tibetan migrants are part of a ‘floating 
population’ as they are individuals who live and work temporarily in another city. Also, while 
Han migration to Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia has a strong agrarian focus, contemporary 
migration to Tibetan areas has been almost entirely urban in destination (Fisher, 2004). This 
migration policy has had negative repercussions. The local Tibetans believe that the Han 
population are the biggest beneficiaries of the economic growth as the Hans live in urban 
areas where the economic change has concentrated, run most of the business and shops, 
and dominate positions of power and privilege in the administration. This is partially due to 
the fact that this rapid economic growth has focussed excessively on urban administrative 
development and large-scale construction projects. As a result, urban-rural inequalities in 
the Tibetan areas are considerably higher than everywhere else in China (Fisher, 2004). 
This situation still leads to distrust and resentment and exacerbates tension between both 
groups which could lead to conflict.  
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The Chinese government has implemented a similar approach in the Xinjiang province with 
similar results and challenges. The next section will examine this example in more detail.  
 
Development policies to combat social unrest in Xinjiang 
 
Xinjiang (which means New Frontier) has for more than two thousand years slipped in and 
out of China until the Communists took firm control of the region in 1949. Xinjiang borders 
eight countries which gives it considerable strategic importance, not least because three of 
these borders – those with Tajikistan, Pakistan and India – remain disputed (Holdstock, 
2014). The region composes one-sixth of China’s total land area, containing a wealth of oil 
and minerals. The area is the homeland of the Uighur ethnic group, Sunni Muslims, who 
have more in common with Central Asia than with China’s majority Han ethnic group mainly 
as they speak a Turkish tongue that is very different from Han Chinese. During Mao’s re-
gime, Islam was tolerated in the region, albeit under the strict control of the Chinese Com-
munist Party in the 1950s, but it suffered greatly during the Cultural Revolution of the late 
1960s. Mosques were closed down or destroyed and imams were imprisoned. During this 
period, all minority ethnic and religious identities disappeared from view. They rapidly re-
emerged in the post 1979 Reform and Opening period demonstrating that they had not been 
erased from the consciousness of the people (Dillon 2014). 
 
The idea that Xinjiang should be considered part of China (both historically and at present) 
is contested by some Uighurs, especially those active in diaspora organisations. While the 
level of support among Uighurs for separatist ideas is unclear (Holdstock, 2014), there is 
certainly widespread resentment against the Chinese government’s policies in the region 
leading to frequent outbreaks of ethnic violence. According to the Chinese government, Ui-
ghur separatist carried out two hundred terrorist attacks between 1990 and 2001 that killed 
162 people and injured more than 440 (source Shirk, 2008, page 58). China’s attempts to 
suppress the violence have led some to complain of a broader clampdown on Uighur culture 
and religion. Although as an ethnic minority Uighurs enjoy affirmative action policies such 
as relaxed university admission standards and less stringent policies on birth control, re-
sentment against these policies in the region is growing. For instance, under family planning 
regulations Han citizens may only have one child, while Uighurs (and other ethnic minorities) 
in the province are allowed to have two, but many Uighurs still regard this as too restrictive. 
Additional complaints include economic exclusion, arbitrary detention, the exclusion of the 
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Uyghur language from education and cultural oppression, and religious restrictions (Hold-
stock, 2014) 
 
Xinjiang has a big economic and strategic value for China. It possesses 25 per cent of 
China’s crude oil reserves; 38 per cent of China’s coal reserves; and 25 per cent of China’s 
natural gas reserves (source: Lim Li and Ritzen, 2015). Over the last sixty years there has 
been a steady migration of Han into Xinjiang which has accelerated rapidly in recent years 
after the government introduced a drive to open up the western regions, and especially the 
oil and gas industry in order to exploit the region’s natural resources. The development strat-
egy of the Chinese government for the region is to reverse the traditional focus on cotton 
production as well as to promote urbanisation and the creation of a strong domestic metro-
politan market (Odgaard, 2012). The oil and petrochemical sector now accounts for 60 per 
cent of the Xinjiang economy, being China’s second largest producer, with abundant re-
serves of oil and gas (Jacques, 2012a, page 321). However, as in Tibet, there is a perception 
that the Han population has benefited more than the Uighur leading to higher economic 
disparities, tensions and riots.  
 
Xinjiang and China’s strategic engagement in Central Asia 
 
Xinjiang is also important for China’s energy security as a transit province for gas and oil 
from a number of Central Asian republics. The energy deals China has signed with Xinjiang’s 
neighbours are key elements of China’s overall engagement strategy for Central Asia. Open-
ing up the Western borders allowed cross border commerce for the first time in thirty years. 
This trade revived links between families and communities that had been separated since 
the early 1960s. But it also enabled cultural and religious organisations to link up which gave 
considerable support to the growing separatist movement in Xinjiang (Johnson, 2007). Bei-
jing authorities began to see the development of these groups as linked to events beyond 
China’s borders, the solution of which required a multinational regional response. The cre-
ation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was a response to these developments. With the goal of estab-
lishing a regional security mechanism through which to resolve border issues and improve 
border security, the members committed themselves to combat ‘the three evil forces: terror-
ism, separatism and extremism’ (Gill, 2010). Establishing the SCO helped China create a 
narrative for itself as a responsible and rising great power, as it establishes a narrative 
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framework for a region in which China has limited experience and not much in common and 
because it also demonstrates how China can engage in regionalist issues as other great 
powers do.   
 
The situation in Xinjiang therefore heavily informs Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia. 
Central Asia occupies an increasingly important position in China’s neighbourhood. China 
needs Central Asia to help it achieve three strategic goals: to develop its western regions, 
to diversify its energy supplies, and to guarantee the security of the Chinese autonomous 
region of Xinjiang (Godement, 2014). The Chinese government’s diplomatic, economic, and 
security initiatives in the region are driven by its desire to achieve these objectives. China’s 
strategy towards Central Asia it is heavily shaped by its domestic outlook as Beijing is con-
cerned that instability in Central Asia might spill over into Xinjiang. China’s interests are 
therefore defensive, as it seeks to prevent any instability in the region from reaching its 
borders and it sees the development of close ties with Russia and the Central Asia states 
as intrinsic to stability in the Xinjiang region. China’s security policy underscores its heavy 
investment in Central Asia, the rationale being that this will fuel economic development in 
the region, thus reducing the prospects of unrest in countries neighbouring Xinjiang, and in 
turn reducing the threat to China’s own stability and territorial integrity (Saferworld, 2015).  
 
Although China has little interest in becoming the regional hegemony in Central Asia and 
acknowledges and respects Russia’s dominant role in the region (as well as Moscow’s 
strong relationship with the Central Asian countries), it does aspire to recognition as a stra-
tegic principal power. Some scholars believe that Beijing’s Central Asia policy is shaped by 
four principal set of interests: strategic positioning, national security, border stability and 
economics and trade (Kornberg and Faust 2005). But the reality is that China offers an 
attractive model for Central Asian states and is becoming a key stakeholder in the region. 
The combination of strong state authority and free market capitalism is undoubtedly attrac-
tive to Central Asian leaders looking to develop their economies, while keeping a firm lid on 
dissent and social unrest. China is also developing its cultural diplomacy and using its soft 
power in the region, focusing mainly on academic cooperation. The Chinese government 
has increased the number of scholarships available each year to Central Asian students. 
And Confucius Institutes have been opened in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ka-
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zakhstan (Godement, 2014). The benefits to China will come in the form of preventing sep-
aratism in Xinjiang, working together to combat terrorism, developing trade, and securing 
access to new energy sources. 
Development as a solution to social unrest 
 
China’s policy in Xinjiang has been to ‘use development to promote stability, use stability to 
ensure development, and further consolidate and develop equal, united, cooperative, and 
harmonious socialist ethnic relations’ (in Odgaard, 2012, page 164). The 1999 ‘Great West-
ern Development Plan’ was designed as the long term development investment in the prov-
ince. The plan involved an investment of $13 billion and 78 separate large-scale projects 
that included building railways and herd settlers westwards in order to ‘open-up’ the western 
provinces (Johnson, 2007). The heavy investment in the region has had positive effects. 
The Xinjiang economy has been growing at around 11 per cent per annum for the last six 
years, (Jacques, 2012a, page 322) which is above the national average. Living standards 
in Xinjiang have also risen since the region was taken over by China in 1949. Literacy rate 
increased from 10 per cent in 1953, to 73.4 per cent in 1990 and 96.58 per cent in 2011. 
Life expectancy has also increased from 31 years in 1953, to 63 years in 1990 and to 71 
years in 2011 (source: Lim Li and Ritzen, 2015) 
 
However, many Uighurs say that they have seen little of that wealth as vast numbers of Han 
Chinese have migrated to Xinjiang to take advantage of the economic opportunities there. 
Despite the investment in infrastructure (new motorways, railways and a new airport) and 
investment in the oil and cotton industries the realities have been disappointing for the pop-
ulation in Xinjiang. Uighur have not appreciated China’s efforts to develop the region and 
bring it out of poverty as they see that most services serve the needs of tourists and migrants 
from the east. The influx of Han migrants also fuels these perceptions. Four decades ago 
only 15 percent of the region’s population had been Han Chinese but that figure is now 50 
percent with an inflow of 1.2 million workers in 2008 alone (Jacques, 2012a, page 322). The 
Chinese government policies have not had the impact expected with foreign investors as 
they are still deterred by the remoteness of Xinjiang, the vast distances (which imply huge 
transport costs), the complexities of Chinese bureaucracy, taxation and corruption and fears 
of sabotage and riots. Moreover, the Uighurs believe that the economic profits are not being 
reinvested locally. For instance, of the oil and gas revenue being generated currently, the 
profits are small and barely 2 percent is reinvested locally in education and administration. 
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Farmland is sold cheaply to new migrants but the chief beneficiary is the Xinjiang Production 
and Construction Corps, not the Uighur population (Johnson, 2007). According to Hessler, 
one of the main issues with the Chinese approach in Xinjiang was its failure to understand 
and respect the Uighur culture. The Han Chinese rarely learned the local language which 
resulted in miscommunications and misperceptions that affected their relationship (Hessler, 
2001). The lack of engagement with the Uighur community led to many misperceptions as 
to the real intentions of the Chinese government in the region. Was the policy really about 
the development or assimilation of the Uighur? Or was it about the exploitation of the area’s 
resources and the pacification of its population? 
 
The role of religion also impacted China’s approach in Xinjiang. China has an unusual view 
of religion and treats it as a form of ideology that is acceptable as a system of individual 
belief which should not be turned into an ethic of community, especially if this is an alterna-
tive to being Chinese (Kerr, 2011). China does not have a stable system of relations with 
the Islamic world and it remains concerned about the compatibility of practices of govern-
ance in the two communities in Xinjiang. In discussing the problems of coexistence between 
the Islamic world and other societies, Chinese analysts have been particularly adamant in 
rejecting any notion of a ‘clash of civilisations’. But this still leaves China with the complex 
question of how it can establish its own preferences for governance in a region riven with 
contentious politics but unified in its scepticism about the helpfulness of external intervention 
(Kerr, 2011) 
 
Critics argue that the violence is really a reflection of local concerns about their treatment, 
overwhelming Han migration and the lack of jobs. China is eager to exploit Xinjiang’s oil and 
cotton, and sees the province as a space to resettle its population from the east, but some 
suggest the plan is to deliberately swamp the Uighur (Johnson, 2007). As in Tibet, the socio-
economic structure of the workforce reflects a very marked ethnic divide with the Han dom-
inating commercial activities, the bureaucracy, oil and gas, and the Uighur living in the 
smaller towns in the rural areas. 
 
Applying the Chinese Peacebuilding Approach at home 
 
Some observers fear the consequences of instability that could be caused by a collapsing, 
rather than a rising China. A China that cannot control flows of immigration, environmental 
implications on the global climate, and internal conflict poses serious problems. As Susan 
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Shirk describes, ‘it is China’s internal fragility, not its growing strength, that presents the 
greatest danger’ (Shirk, 2008). Or as President Bill Clinton put it in 1999: ‘while most people 
worry about the challenge of a strong China, let us not forget the risk of a weak China, beset 
by internal conflict, social dislocation and criminal activity; becoming a vast zone of instability 
in Asia’ (in S. Nye Jr., 2011).  
 
China is genuinely concerned about maintaining domestic peace and stability. Not only be-
cause the economy needs that stability to keep growing, but also because any internal con-
flict could potentially affect the legitimacy of the government. However, the Chinese peace-
building approach of focusing on economic development and conflict prevention in order to 
minimise conflicts and instability has had a limited success in both Tibet and Xinjiang. In the 
case of Xinjiang, economic growth has not diminished the tensions between the Han and 
the Uighur, who increasingly feel excluded in their own homeland. Similarly to Tibet, the key 
problems that the government has to confront are those of inequality and discrimination. 
Dissatisfied groups are not only ethnic groups in Tibet and Xinjiang. A similar interaction 
pattern can be found among disgruntled workers, farmers, and other elements of society 
who consider themselves marginalised by the Chinese polity. This type of dissatisfaction 
emerges in social issues such as corruption, pollution, inequality, the failure to compensate 
people for expropriated land etc.  
 
Therefore, China’s strategy in Xinjiang and Tibet has only partially succeeded. Despite im-
pressive progress on development, economic growth and education, Beijing’s strategy to 
merely satisfy demands through improving conditions is not working as expected mainly 
because it is not addressing the root causes of the dissatisfaction. In the case of Tibet and 
Xinjiang, economic development on its own has not seemed to resolve the tensions (some 
may argue that it has exacerbated the tensions). In other words, China’s strategy for main-
taining domestic peace and security implies that it has yet to develop an effective model for 
how to apply its peacebuilding approach at home. A more context-sensitive approach in its 
ethnic regions and comprehensive measures that address the root causes of the conflicts 
and the inequalities created by the rapid economic growth are needed. 
 
Chapter Four: China’s Global Peace Engagement Strat-
egy 
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‘Listen to all, pluck a feather from every passing goose, but follow no one absolutely’  
Chinese proverb 
 
 
For much of its history, Chinese civilisation saw no reason to engage the world. Its mind 
always focussed on developing Chinese civilisation not developing a global civilisation. Ever 
since the end of the nineteenth century, and arguably since the First Opium War, Chinese 
foreign policy has been dominated by the country’s relative impotence and the necessity of 
adapting to Western norms and a Western-dominated international system. However, since 
the end of the Cold War, Chinese officials have become more attentive to foreign percep-
tions of China’s international behaviour and an indigenous Chinese foreign policy has begun 
to emerge. In the last decades, China has shown a more moderate, dynamic, context-spe-
cific and accommodating foreign policy, oriented towards maintaining regional stability, and 
increasing its membership and involvement in regional and multilateral bodies. The Chinese 
leadership is seen as determined to avoid foreign confrontation as it pursues economic de-
velopment at home and abroad. China is thus more concerned about how its rise is per-
ceived in the eyes of other countries, wishing to be accepted and recognised not only as a 
member of the international community but also as a ‘responsible great power’. China’s 
efforts to prove that it is a responsible power have succeeded in Asia and beyond. Interna-
tional opinion polls indicate that people around the world view China positively, more posi-
tively than the United States (Shirk, 2008). 
 
The evolution in foreign policy and transition from economic, military and ideological self-
reliance to active engagement in regional and global multilateral structures is part of China’s 
‘Peaceful coexistence’ strategic thinking. As a result, China’s global and regional diplomacy 
has dramatically changed. China’s identity in international affairs has evolved from one 
based on a defensive power marked by insecurity to that of a confident and ascending great 
power. As China’s interests broadened, it also became more concerned about improving its 
national image. China started using the concepts of ‘peace’ and ‘harmony’ as part of its 
foreign policy strategy as early as in 1954. China’s security strategies and foreign policy 
have since then encompassed conflict resolution, diplomacy and legitimacy. These con-
cepts have been used in order to reduce the fear of an aggressive China rise that could 
impact the current international order. 
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This chapter will examine some of the characteristics of the Chinese foreign policy, its roots 
in Confucianism, its principles and its evolution as China socialises with the rest of the inter-
national community. It will then examine the Chinese Global Peace Engagement strategy 
as a way for China to promote peace through growing trade, investment and economic co-
operation with the rest of the world (including conflict-affected states) and through the pro-
vision of aid and support of international institutions such as the UN on peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding operations. Finally, this chapter will examine how this strategy has been im-
plemented in Africa and some of the challenges and successes of the Chinese policy in 
Sudan and South Sudan as an example.  
 
A unique foreign policy 
Roots of the Chinese Foreign Policy 
 
Chinese foreign policy is rooted in its own philosophical values and norms and it normally 
reflects a very unique approach to strategy and diplomacy. It generally exhibits three char-
acteristics that are very distinct from the Western approach to diplomacy: long-term ap-
proach and vision and a more holistic way of perceiving politics; careful study of tactical 
options, and detached exploration of operational decisions.  
 
Chinese foreign policy is heavily influenced by the teachings of Sun Tzu. In his book ‘The 
Art of War’, Sun Tzu emphasises the psychological and political elements over the military. 
Where Western strategists reflect on the means to assemble superior power at the decisive 
point, Sun Tzu addresses the means of building a dominant political and psychological po-
sition, such that the outcome of a conflict becomes a foregone conclusion. And where West-
ern strategists test their maxims by victories in battles; Sun Tzu tests by victories where 
battles have become unnecessary (Kissinger, 2011). These approach was encapsulated on 
the 28 characters Den Xiaoping used for political wisdom: ‘observe and analyse (develop-
ments) calmly; deal (with changes) patiently and confidently; secure (our own) position; con-
ceal (our) capabilities and avoid the limelight; be good at keeping a low profile; never be-
come a leader; strive to make achievements’ (Mahbubani, 2008, page 224) 
 
This tactical approach is also reflected on the way Chinese deal with diplomacy. According 
to Henri Kissinger who led the re-open of the communication channels between the US and 
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China, rarely do Chinese statesman risk the outcome of a conflict on a single all-or-nothing 
clash; on the contrary, elaborate multiyear manoeuvres are closer to their style. Where the 
Western tradition ‘prized the decisive clash of forces emphasising feats of heroism, the Chi-
nese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage’ 
(Kissinger, 2011). For the Chinese, the notion of power emphasised the importance of tim-
ing, of selecting the propitious moment, of understanding when best to act (Pye, 1985).  
Moreover, Kissinger describes that: 
 
“China’s negotiators use diplomacy to weave together political, military, and physio-
logical elements into an overall strategic design. Diplomacy to them is the elabora-
tion of a strategic principle. They ascribe no particular significance to the process of 
negotiation as such; nor do they consider the opening of a particular negotiation a 
transformational event. They do not think that personal relations can affect their 
judgement though they might invoke personal ties to facilitate their own efforts. They 
have no emotional difficulty with deadlocks; they consider them the inevitable mech-
anism of diplomacy. They prize gestures of goodwill only if they serve a diginable 
objective or tactic. And they patiently take the long view against impatient interlocu-
tors, making time their ally” (Kissinger, 2011, page 222) 
 
Because of the unique characteristics, China has developed a distinctive approach to diplo-
macy which is reflected in their foreign policy and its principles.  
Peaceful Coexistence: The Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy 
 
The foreign policy framework that emerged early in Den Xiaoping’s era, and that has con-
tinued to exert an influence, was named the “five principles of peaceful coexistence”. These 
principles included: “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-ag-
gression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence” (MacDougall, 2007). These principles are based on the Confucian 
ideal of Great Harmony: a foreign policy that promotes international peace while allowing for 
legitimate national self-interests (Bell, 2010). Den Xiaoping’s new strategy meant that China 
should stay neutral in wars, conflicts about spheres of influence or struggles over natural 
resources. In order to do this, Beijing should be ‘humble and yield on small issues with the 
long term in mind’ (Leonard, 2008). China should open its arms to any country that could 
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assist in its quest for markets, natural resources and political support. The principles around 
coexistence have been the cornerstone of China’s national security strategy. Coexistence 
is defined by Odgaard as the attempt to preserve peace and stability through common habits 
and practices designed to regulate international conduct (Odgaard, 2012, page 5). In the 
case of China, the means are the establishment of conflict resolution mechanisms for the 
purpose of system preservation, the use of conference diplomacy to make within-system 
adjustments, and agreement on common definitions of legitimate political authority. The end 
is to offload the cost of pursuing national security concerns onto the international community 
by making it a common responsibility for the collective of international actors. Odgaard ar-
gues that coexistence is a strategy of influence for emerging powers as it implies that states 
may pursue their national interests as long as these do not jeopardise international stability 
and it does not require the military, economic, financial and knowledge capabilities to adopt 
strategies of coercion and imposition. Rather, states pursuing coexistence seek to establish 
a global order in which conflicts can be resolved without breaching the consensus about 
what constitutes legitimate spheres of influence (Odgaard, 2012). The five principles of co-
existence went on to become the basic foundations of Chinese foreign policy. Three of the 
‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’ still heavily influence China’s relations and impact 
the Chinese peacebuilding approach. Those are the principles of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and 
respect of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.  
 
Due to China’s own history and its sensitivity on issues such as Taiwan and Tibet, China’s 
bilateral relations since the end of the Cold War largely adhere to the Westphalian view on 
the primacy of state sovereignty and determined by the principle of non-interference. This 
meant that domestic political affairs were seen as the exclusive concern of national govern-
ments and therefore other states should respect this principle, no matter the conduct of the 
government. China has used the principle of non-interference as a means through which it 
can maintain stable relations with host governments to ensure economic cooperation con-
tinues unaffected by possible political changes. Beijing uses this principle also to explain 
why China’s relations with host governments are state centric (government to government) 
arguing that national governments alone should focus on and respond to matters related to 
domestic political, economic and social affairs – including internal conflict. China believes 
that the principle of non-interference is inherently peaceful. Yet some analysts have argued 
that China has worsened internal situations in countries that are either authoritarian, human 
rights violators, in conflict or post-conflict settings (Saferworld, 2011). Moreover, critiques of 
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this approach argue that the non-interference principle undermines good governance, de-
mocratisation and human rights. On the other hand, supporters of this approach argue that 
human rights are “first and foremost a right to subsistence”, with socio-economic rights tak-
ing precedence over abstract political rights (Weiwei, 2012). Some analysts believe that by 
imposing sanctions and isolating countries the West is actually insulating them from social-
ising with common international norms and protecting their regimes. By contrast if promoting 
other forms of influence, such as encouraging young people to study overseas and encour-
aging business to trade and create investment links between them and the rest of the world, 
change will come much faster to conflict-affected countries (Mahbubani, 2013). Further-
more, supporters also argue that political rights cannot be imposed from the outside and 
that each country must choose its own path; instead, sovereignty is to be protected and 
autonomy honoured to allow for indigenous development strategies (Saferworld, 2012). 
From non-intervention to creative involvement 
 
Over the last years, Beijing has realised that non-interference in the internal affairs of recip-
ient countries may work to ensure the stability of bilateral relations, but it is no guarantee of 
internal stability in countries at risk from conflict. For this reason, in recent years, China has 
softened its interpretation of these principles and has taken a more active diplomatic role in 
the resolution of internal conflicts as part of a wider strategy to become a ‘responsible 
power’. One of the new foreign policy strategies suggested by Chinese foreign policy Wang 
Yizhou referred to as ‘creative involvement’ represents a substantial normative change to 
China’s principles and strategy. 
 
For Yizhou, creative involvement means moving away from being a norm taker and become 
a norm maker in the field of foreign affairs and start implanting ‘Chinese characteristics’ by 
taking a more active part in global governance. It is aimed at ‘getting something done’, em-
phasising leadership, initiative, and constructiveness in China’s diplomacy by shaping inter-
national rules and causing nations to accept China’s right to speak up for its interest while 
respecting international practices and development trends, (Yizhou, 2012). Although advo-
cating active participation in international affairs, ‘creative involvement’ has essential differ-
ences from interventionism. It encourages the active exploration of all possible diplomatic 
options and advocates for conflict prevention measures (by stressing diplomatic mediation 
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and economic assistance) and calls for active contact and involvement instead of interven-
tion by force (military-first approach or armed suppression). Yizhou further argues that the 
concept is not an opposition to the traditional Chinese diplomatic principles, but rather an 
enrichment of these principles. He believes ‘creative involvement’ should be always con-
ducted on the basis of international legitimacy and that China should follow three principles 
when implementing this strategy: ‘obeying the UN Charter, being invited or accepted by local 
people or a majority of political parties in the state concerned, and conforming to the wishes 
of most of its neighbouring countries’ (Yizhou, 2012). 
 
There are increasing examples of ‘creative involvement’ interventions in both in Asia and 
Africa. For example, China acted as a mediator between Sudan and South Sudan to protect 
its oil investments; intervened in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo by asking 
Rwanda to remove a key rebel commander who was questioning Chinese investments; and 
engaged in shuttle diplomacy between India and Pakistan (ICG, 2013b). Recently, China 
attempted to step into Palestine-Israel mediation in order to secure energy supplies in the 
Middle East and successfully intervened as a mediator in the Kachin peace talks between 
the government of Myanmar and an ethnic armed group (see more on this case study on 
Chapter Four). A key principle in all of these cases was to have the consent by all of the 
parties involved. A top Chinese official said of the Myanmar mediation in the Kachin conflict, 
‘we will only do it if invited in. If we are not invited, we will leave’ (ICG, 2013b). Regardless 
of the increasing examples of ‘creative involvement’ strategies and intervention, non-inter-
ference and sovereignty still remain at the core of China’s engagement and any policy 
changes to their interpretation is cautious and in many cases restricted to ad hoc responses 
to specific contexts. The following section will examine how China has put into practice some 
of these characteristics and principles into its foreign policy since the reform era and during 
its peaceful rise in global affairs.  
 
China’s peaceful economic rise 
 
Since the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, Beijing has stated that it pursues an ‘independent 
foreign policy of peace’ under which China’s fundamental foreign policy goals are to pre-
serve China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to create a favourable 
international environment for China’s reform and opening up and modernisation (Permanent 
Mission of China to the UN). In order to achieve these goals, China has opted for a path that 
emphasises economic growth rather than military capacity with the objective  
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to facilitate the achievement of stability and economic growth within China itself. With the 
world’s largest population and just average living standards, there is a great challenge just 
to provide the basic needs of the people in terms of employment, food, housing, health and 
education. From the perspective of foreign policy there is an argument that China should 
focus on those international relationships that are going to be more helpful for the country’s 
economic growth. Because of the relationship between the government and its citizens, en-
suring economic growth is essential as failure to make progress will undermine the existing 
political system. Therefore, according to the Chinese way of thinking, China will be politically 
more stable if the economy continues to grow. 
 
Internationally, China has chosen to focus its efforts on creating its own alternative networks, 
at one level with other rising powers such as other BRICS countries, and on another level 
with the suppliers of the key resources it needs as inputs for its economy. As a result, China 
has a mercantilist trade and investment posture in the international arena and has become 
a major investor in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Europe. Its model of economic 
cooperation has been defined as the ‘Walled World’ where nation states can trade with each 
other on global markets but maintain their control over their economic future, their political 
system and their foreign policy (Leonard, 2008).   
Chinese Soft Power 
 
China has been accompanying the rise of its hard economic power with efforts to make itself 
more attractive (soft power). Combining hard and soft power resources into a single and 
effective strategy is what S. Nye Jr. has defined as ‘Smart Power’ (S. Nye Jr., 2011). China’s 
soft power strategy relies on its economic wealth and power, its ability to promote large-
scale growth especially for other developing states, cooperation and cultural power (Lan-
teigne, 2009). It is also founded on promoting Confucian peaceful norms and values in order 
to reduce the fear and tendencies to balance Chinese power that might otherwise grow 
among its neighbours. As Chinese officials believe that Chinese culture is quite attractive to 
foreigners and the tradition that treasures peace is widely appreciated, China recognises 
that its soft power can be used to enhance China’s peaceful rise in the regional and world 
affairs and to facilitate China’s economic development and modernisation. Jacques (2012b) 
believes that China should have a more expansive view of soft power to include infra-struc-
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ture developments (rail network, airports, etc.), family values (such as stronger parental au-
thority, high academic expectations, moral guidelines, in contrast to the more laissez-faire 
western mentality) and an awareness of the importance of education for national economic 
performance (Confucian societies place much greater emphasis on education than western 
societies, as exemplified by the high performance levels that parents expect and demand of 
their children).  
 
However, even if economic wealth is a fundamental determinant of a country’s wider appeal, 
China’s soft power strategy is still not having a global impact. As the example of the eco-
nomic transformation and poverty reduction of a developing country, and the largest trading 
partner of many nations in Africa, East Asia, Latin America and elsewhere, China already 
enjoys considerable respect and influence among developing countries. In contrast, China 
enjoys very little soft power in the west. The main reasons for this are that China is still a 
relatively poor developing country and the absence of a Western-type multi-party democ-
racy. Even if the Chinese government has been relying on Confucianism and other philo-
sophical values to shape its discourse and foreign policy in order to confront some of the 
challenges posed by its rapid economic growth and to project a ‘peaceful image’, in many 
Western countries China is still perceived as a rigid and repressive country. As the economic 
model is inseparable from the political one, even the fast economic growth and cultural civ-
ilisation will have little appeal in the West who mainly sees China as an authoritarian regime 
with limited civil liberties and a track record of human rights violations.   
China and International Norms and Institutions 
 
As China’s global interests expanded, it has realised that in order to meet its economic 
interests, a more proactive approach with the international system and its organisations is 
needed. Therefore, as with its foreign policy, there has been an evolution of China’s behav-
iour towards international institutions: from opposition in 1950s to 1970s to a generally pas-
sive position during the 1980s and 1990s when it sought membership in international insti-
tutions, to a more selective and activist position in international institutions during the early 
2000s when Beijing became more confident, to a more recent, moderately revisionist pos-
ture since 2008 that seeks to selectively alter rules, actors and the balance of influence 
largely from within existing institutions (Shambaugh, 2013). 
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China has undergone an identity change from a defensive and insecure power to a confident 
ascending power aspiring to take more responsibility. This has made China more receptive 
to international pressure and more willing to behave in accordance with international norms. 
However, there is still no consensus around the debate of whether China is a ‘norm maker’ 
or a ‘norm taker’. For while China’s rising capabilities are undisputed, many scholars believe 
that China has no interest in leading the creation of a new global order and that it has chosen 
to not yet assert itself politically (Mahbubani, 2008; Odgaard, 2012). According to this school 
of thought, Chinese diplomacy remains extremely passive for a state of its size and im-
portance, repeatedly taking a low-key, backseat approach. They see China as risk adverse 
and narrowly self-interested, not shaping the events and actively contributing to solving 
problems. On the other hand, other scholars argue that China is trying to establish alterna-
tive institutions and norms of global governance and redistribute power and resources within 
the international system (Shambaugh, 2013). But even if Beijing says that China will peace-
fully rise as a responsible power within the present international system, and not challenge 
the structures and norms of the current world order, there seems to be an appetite in China 
for ‘Chinese solutions’ for world problems as proven by the success in China of books ad-
vocating for a ‘Tianxia’ world order (Callahan, 2011b). 
 
What is clear is that since the mid-1990s, China’s foreign policy has evolved to become 
more convergent with global norms of cooperation than previously. China has shown an 
increased willingness to engage with many institutions that are Western dominated and is 
making selective and strategic use of international organisations through engagement to 
advance its power and capabilities in the international system and move towards developing 
as a global power. For instance, China’s view on the UN has also evolved and become more 
flexible. China has become one of the world’s strongest advocates of the UN, as it is founded 
on the basis of China’s foundational principles of state sovereignty and universal equal rep-
resentation. China actively defends the definition of legitimate war as an act that can only 
be approved through multilateral institutions such as the UN. One reason for China’s in-
creasingly flexible approach to the fundamental norms of the UN system is that cooperation 
on intervention has presented Beijing with a relatively low cost way in which to demonstrate 
reasonableness in its handling of foreign policy issues (Odgaard, 2012). An indicator of this 
shift has been China’s changing patterns in the international system, its increasing flexibility 
on the principles of sovereignty and intervention, as well as its growing support to UN peace-
keeping and peacebuilding operations. This evolution has been prompted by a number of 
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factors: by a growing recognition in Beijing of the value of aligning its national interests with 
international norms and making tangible contributions to international security, but also by 
China’s increasing socialisation and interaction with the international community. However, 
the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) suggests that Beijing is also 
comfortable with organisations which do not include Western members or norms. Lanteigne, 
argues that there is a possibility that China might be more tempted in the future to develop 
or support other organisations as a means of balancing Western power (Lanteigne, 2009).  
 
Exporting China’s Global Peace Engagement Strategy  
 
Beijing has been engaging in a ‘charm offensive’ to convince the world of its peaceful status 
quo intentions. President Hu in the 2000s developed a ‘comprehensive national strategy’ or 
‘global peace engagement strategy’ via a peaceful economic rise. The principles and goals 
of this strategy were conflict prevention, peace restoration, peacekeeping and post-conflict 
reconstruction; and linking domestic and international interests with a goal of improving its 
economic and political capabilities in order to create a more peaceful world in which China 
will grow (Lanteigne, 2009). President Hu also developed the concept of ‘Harmonious World’ 
to explain his government’s foreign policy preferences. Officials and scholars in China ex-
plain ‘building a harmonious world’ as a new (and better) way of seeking ‘lasting peace and 
common prosperity, whereby different civilisations can coexist in the global community’ (Cal-
lahan, 2011a). Therefore, the idea of a ‘harmonious world’ rests on the need for harmony 
and justice in international affairs, the democratisation of the international system which also 
respects the sovereignty of large and small state; the rejection of alliances and instead the 
building of secured communities which reflect post-Cold War Issues, and respect for inter-
national law and institutions such as the UN (Lanteigne, 2009). 
 
According to Lei, China’s global peace engagement strategy is an integral part of China’s 
grand strategy, conceived as part of a triangle in which domestic, regional and global policies 
interact in the pursuit of three overarching interests and demands: economic development 
to enhance domestic stability and legitimacy; promotion of a peaceful external environment 
free of threats to Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity in Asia; and, cultivation of 
China’s status and influence as a responsible great power in global politics (Lei, 2011). To 
this end, the global peace engagement strategy aims to maintain a peaceful external envi-
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ronment to sustain China’s peaceful development and portray a civilised and non-threaten-
ing country. China’s strategy can be described as a low-key, long-term effort designed to 
persuade rather than provoke. 
 
The key enablers to implement the Global Peace Engagement strategy are economic in-
vestment and agreements with countries, support international institutions such as the UN 
on peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations and increase the strategic foreign assis-
tance by increasing Chinese foreign aid. The next section is going to explore China’s emerg-
ing role in International Peacebuilding as well as on foreign aid assistance as the key com-
ponent of the Global Peace Engagement Strategy. 
International Peacebuilding with Chinese Characteristics 
 
Until recently, Beijing has shown great reluctance towards multilateral missions that heavily 
interfere in what it considers to be the domestic and sovereign affairs of states. Today, none-
theless, international peacebuilding missions have become an area of great interest for 
many Chinese scholars and policy makers. Together with Peacekeeping, they see peace-
building as a potential new area where China can play a larger role through which they can 
contribute to the two main pillar of their global peace engagement strategy and architecture 
(Lei, 2011). Although the terminology of ‘peacebuilding’ or ‘post-conflict’ does not really exist 
in Chinese foreign policy the approach that China has taken on international peacebuilding 
promotes the same goals as its ‘development through peace’ approach which is tackling 
poverty reduction through economic development. China is therefore promoting in the inter-
national system and institutions the same principles that they are trying to implement in their 
domestic context: because poverty leads to instability and social unrest, the longer terms of 
peacebuilding must be the eradication of poverty and the development of the economy. As 
stated by Shen Guofang, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN:  
 
“Poverty leads to social instability, which will in turn be a threat to peace and security 
at the national and even regional levels (…). In order to uproot the causes of con-
flicts, we must help developing countries, especially the least-developed countries, 
to seek economic development, eradicate poverty, curb diseases, improve the envi-
ronment and fight against social injustice.”  
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According to Chinese analysts, the early realisation of the disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration of ex-combatants and the promotion of the repatriation, resettlement and the 
economic recovery of refugees and displaced persons should constitute the short-term ob-
jectives of peacebuilding. The long-term objectives, however, should be the eradication of 
poverty, development of the economy as well as ‘a peaceful and rewarding life for people in 
the post-conflict countries and regions’ (in Lei, 2011, page 353) 
 
In 2005 President Hu publicly and officially embraced a ‘comprehensive strategy featuring 
prevention, peace restoration, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction’. Understand-
ing the increasing complexity and evolving nature of multilateral mission, Hu noted: ‘in areas 
emerging from conflict, ensuring the rule of law and justice should become an integral part 
of the overall effort to achieve peace and stability, protecting the fundamental interests of 
local populations and serving the overall interests of social stability’ (Huang, 2011). The 
expression of Chinese support for the strengthening of the UN’s peacebuilding capacity and 
‘better co-ordination and integration of all UN peacebuilding endeavours’ bears witness to 
this trend, as does China’s contribution, from 2006 to 2011, of US$4.0 million to the UN 
Peacebuilding Fund (Saferworld, 2012). Furthermore, publicly supporting international 
peacebuilding efforts is also part of the Chinese soft power strategy, as these efforts will 
contribute to improve China’s image as an aid donor, peace contributor, and conflict medi-
ator.  
 
Ensuring stability within Chinese borders also influences China’s support of international 
peacebuilding. As China shares border with some fragile states such as Myanmar, Pakistan 
or North Korea, conflict in these countries could impact stability in China and bring about 
economic and refugee problems. Moreover, as seen in the case of Xinjiang, state failure in 
these countries could result in China’s border regions becoming havens for radical Islamic 
groups that could potentially link up with secession movements in the Western provinces. 
China’s growing influence in other Asian countries such as Afghanistan, Sri Lanka or Nepal, 
also shapes conflict dynamics and prospects for sustainable peace. Therefore, the stabili-
sation of fragile states through intrusive means is acceptable to Beijing, provided it is done 
through multilateral institutions such as the UN or the World Bank.   
 
Although China is becoming more supportive of international peacebuilding efforts, China 
advocates for an international ‘Chinese peacebuilding approach’ as it consistently stresses 
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some of the characteristics and principles of the Chinese foreign policy: respect for the right 
of the country concerned to make its own decisions is fundamental to post-conflict peace-
building; the primary task of peacebuilding is to restore the administrative functions of state 
organs of the country; and international assistance should take into full consideration the 
development priorities identified independently by the country (Lei, 2011). China, therefore 
advocates for a context-specific approach to peacebuilding and has for instance, stated that 
it rejects the notion of unified standards for peacebuilding endeavours (De Carvalho and De 
Coning, 2013). In this sense, China does not favour the perceived Western interventionist 
trend, imposing a predetermined model of governance, military action, humanitarian inter-
vention or regime change, promoting human rights or liberal forms of governance. However, 
China accepts that there is a need to help a country carry out political and economic restruc-
turing, and understands that the UN needs to carry out certain administrative functions. 
Chinese Foreign Aid 
 
As the world’s fastest rising power, China has sharply expanded its foreign aid spending in 
both scale and scope over the last decade. The terminology of foreign assistance refers to 
aid used to forward China’s major security interests and strategic objectives. The concept 
of foreign aid also encompasses any form of strategic assistance and investment in foreign 
countries provided by the government, such as civilian and military assistance; investment 
in energy and natural resources; and investment in and construction of infrastructure, com-
munication facilities, disaster relief, student scholarships, and links of industrial chains in 
strategically important regions (Yizhou, 2012). The Department of Foreign Aid sits under the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and is responsible for administrating the foreign aid pro-
gram in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly to Peacebuilding, China 
is challenging the longstanding aid principles held by the traditional Western Aid donors and 
is boasting its own, distinctive humanitarian identity shaped by its own history and experi-
ence as well as its particular cultural values.   
 
China is not a new international donor, as it has been distributing aid for over six decades, 
and during this time it has developed its own principles for carrying out foreign aid. The main 
difference with the western-liberal approach is that while the Western understanding of hu-
manitarianism is based on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independ-
ence, China’s notion of the same has always been shaped by the Confucian principles of 
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responsibility and state legitimacy (Taidong, 2013). Based on the principles of economic 
development to reduce poverty and conflict, Chinese aid is packaged as a form of mutual 
economic partnership, directed towards infrastructure development as these projects seen 
as a prerequisite to socioeconomic development and are seen in China as integral to its own 
experience of development. One of the most contentious difference with Western donors, is 
China’s commitment to a ‘no strings attached’ principle. While Western aid prioritises spend-
ing on good governance projects, China links aid more explicitly to economic objectives, 
such as securing energy resources or opening new markets for products. China also provide 
assistance through a broader array of financial instruments, combining concessional loans, 
export credits, and debt write-offs with special trade arrangements and commercial invest-
ments, often in support of infrastructure development (Stromseth, 2012; Taidong, 2013). 
The principle of non-interference also influences China’s view on foreign aid as Western 
donors actively engage, participate and control development process, China does not inter-
fere in internal affairs and allows the country to be more in control of the process. 
 
It is very likely that China will significantly augment its foreign aid contributions in the next 
few years as it would continue to help achieve China’s strategic objectives as aid could 
become a powerful tool in the expansion of China’s influence. But even if China’s foreign 
aid has grown consistently in recent years, it has far to go to reach international standards. 
For instance, despite some recent moves toward greater aid transparency, China still has 
not released specific operational and financial information regarding its overseas activities 
at both the country and project level (Taidong, 2013). China’s aid programme has also been 
criticised for its infrastructure-based and state-centric approach, which tends to bypass a 
wider range of civil society actors; its pursuit of natural resources and for sustaining auto-
cratic regimes and retarding progress on human rights (Krebs, 2014). However, China is 
still changing and adapting its foreign aid principles. For instance, currently China makes no 
difference between aid to conflict and non-conflict countries but is becoming more sensitive 
about the consequences of its assistance and the need to make sure that assistance is not 
being abused by recipient governments (Saferworld, 2012). Therefore, while China has 
taken a distinctive approach to foreign aid and humanitarian action, the country is becoming 
more pragmatic and accepting international norms. As part of their soft power and peace 
engagement strategy, China’s increasing engagement with international structures, includ-
ing channelling humanitarian aid through multilateral mechanisms, indicates a strong nor-
mative change in aid policy and practice. 
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After examining the main characteristics of the Chinese Global Peace Engagement Strat-
egy, the following section will look at how this strategy has been implemented in recent years 
in Africa.  
 
Implementing the Global Peace Engagement Strategy in Africa 
 
In terms of international aid and economic cooperation, Africa had attracted little interest 
from the West since the mid-1970s and the aid they received was subject to the highly con-
ditionality of the Washington consensus. China with its own experience of colonisation, its 
anti-colonial record and its status as a developing country, has developed more legitimacy 
and enjoys greater affinity with the African nations than does the West. However, according 
to US researches, China has committed $75bn on aid and development projects in Africa in 
the past decade which is still less than the $90bn the US committed over that period (Provost 
& Harris 2013). Many African states have welcomed Chinese investment as a preferable 
alternative to Western aid. This was reflected in a 2012 BBC poll that showed that residents 
of African countries where China has heavily invested tended to be much more favourable 
to Beijing’s economic rise than those in the West: some 89 per cent of Nigerians and 75 per 
cent of Kenyans felt positively towards China’s influence in the world, as compared with 42 
per cent of Americans and 57 per cent of Britons (Chu, 2013). 
 
Although China in general supports large infrastructure programmes, they have also started 
doing development, education and cultural projects as well. For instance, in Liberia, China 
has put millions towards the installation of solar traffic lights in Monrovia and financed a 
malaria prevention centre. In Mozambique, China's projects include a National School for 
Visual Arts in Maputo and in Algeria, construction has begun to build an opera house (Prov-
ost & Harris 2013). China has also sent thousands of doctors and teachers to work in Africa, 
welcomed many more students to learn in China or in Chinese language classes abroad 
and rolled out a continent-wide network of sports stadiums and concert halls. This contra-
dicts the view that many analysts have that all intervention projects of China in Africa are 
related to the extraction of natural resources.  
 
The positive impacts of China’s intervention and aid programmes in Africa are quite visible 
in the continent and include: driving up both demand and prices for those African countries 
that are commodity exports; providing an un-conditional alternative to Western, IMF and 
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World Bank source of trade, aid and investment; boosting the strategic importance of Africa 
in the world economy; and providing an investment in infrastructural projects such as roads, 
railways, major public buildings etc. (Jacques, 2012a). However, China’s assistance and 
foreign policy in Africa has also received many critiques. These mainly include claims that 
the Chinese approach has been primarily centred on capturing the elites and the resources 
under their control. Civil society groups have focussed on concerns that China is having a 
negative impact on local labour, trade, governance, and the environment. Also, China faces 
threats on several fronts such as reputational risks derived from its association with certain 
governments; risks to its business interests posed by weak regulatory regimes; and risks 
faced by its citizens operating in unstable African environments (Alden, 2014). But in fragile 
countries where the very nature of regime legitimacy itself is contested and the regime’s 
ability to enforce its rule over the population and territory is limited at best, the security chal-
lenges are manifold. “Whether China likes it or not, it plays a significant role in peace and 
security in Africa; negatively, through its absence, and positively, through an increased part-
nership with African states and institutions working for peace and security” (Lyasu, in Alden 
2014) 
 
An example that illustrates both the benefits and challenges of Chinese foreign aid is that of 
South Sudan. Chinese commercial operations in South Sudan increased since 2005, when 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement brought Sudan’s long-running civil war to an end. 
China’s strategy in South Sudan was to promote economic development as a fundamental 
prerequisite to solve the country’s disputes with Sudan (Zhang, 2012). According to a Saf-
erworld Report in 2013, China had approved 60 projects in a range of sectors including 
roads, schools, telecoms, energy, and bridges which were highly needed in the newly inde-
pendent country as the World Bank estimates the annual infrastructure funding gap at $879 
million a year (Saferworld, 2013). The impact of these projects has been very positive, fast-
tracking the construction of roads across vast and remote locations and stimulating local 
economies. However, as China’s companies don’t get involved on local affairs and they rely 
on the host government for communications, there was very limited consultation with the 
local community which meant that many of the projects did not target community needs and 
failed to succeed (Saferworld, 2013). This also generated local grievance and fuelled secu-
rity incidents against Chinese companies and citizens as the local population perceived that 
China had not sufficiently helped the communities.  
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In terms of Chinese contributions to peacebuilding in Africa, Chinese foreign policy has been 
more ad hoc. Although in official statements the Chinese government has declared that 
China will promote conflict resolution through negotiations by stating ‘China calls for settling 
disputes and conflicts through talks and consultation and by seeking common ground while 
putting aside differences’ (Saferworld, 2012), its capacity to act as a conflict manager has 
been limited to areas where Chinese’s interests were at risk. For instance, China played the 
role of mediator, in pushing partner regimes into talks in Rwanda and the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo and in the case of Libya China voted for the imposition of sanctions on 
Muammar Qaddafi’s regime and the referral of the conflict to the International Criminal Court 
(Richmond and Tellidis, 2014). 
 
The most marked change in the Chinese attitude towards its commitment to peace initiatives 
in Africa has been seen in the case of the conflict of Darfur, Sudan.  China has traditionally 
been an ally of diplomatically-isolated Sudan. Despite its official rhetoric supporting Sudan’s 
territorial integrity, and the consent of the Sudanese government prior to the deployment of 
any UN peacekeeping mission, Chinese diplomats put immense pressure on Sudanese 
president Omar Al-Bashir to accept these deployments. The approaches that China used in 
the Darfur issue-resolution were political dialogue, consultation and diplomatic means in-
stead of the use of sanctions and other forms of unilateral action (Jian, 2012). The involve-
ment of China in the Sudan conflict demonstrated that China had entered a new stage and 
was ready to start using its influence for peacebuilding purposes. The intervention triggered 
an important debate in China with analysts arguing that China should not maintain an un-
critical embrace of such an autocratic and corrupt regime that has committed atrocious 
crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur (Saferworld, 2011). 
 
The examples of Sudan and South Sudan show that China is beginning to be more sensitive 
to the complexities of regional conflict in Africa and the needs of the local population. Overall, 
China’s approach to economic development has been welcomed across the continent and 
provided benefits, such as infrastructure, jobs and services, that may be more sustainable 
and transformative than western aid.  
 
An evolving foreign policy and strategy 
 
China has a unique foreign policy and principles that influences the way the country interacts 
with other countries and international organisations. However, as China’s influence grows 
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and as the country feels more comfortable in the international system, China’s views and 
policies on foreign policy will evolve and adapt. This is clearly reflected on the evolution of 
the Chinese foreign policy from a limited engagement with the outside world, to a limited 
foreign policy based on the principles of non-interference and respect to mutual sovereignty 
and to a more interventionists approach of ‘creative involvement’. As seen in the example 
of international peacebuilding and foreign aid, China is also trying to export its own distinc-
tive model and become more of a ‘norm maker’ than it has been in the past. Because of the 
different kind of political tradition, its history and post-colonial society, the Communist regime 
with its unique characteristics (an authoritarian Confucian state rather than a democratic 
system) and sophisticated statecraft, China will act as an alternative model to the West and 
will export these characteristics to the rest of the world. But as examined through the Global 
Peace Engagement Strategy that China is promoting, the Chinese model and approach also 
has its challenges when implemented as discussed in the Africa example. The next chapter 
will consider an example of ‘creative involvement’ of Chinese foreign policy in its neighbour 
country of Myanmar.  
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Chapter Five: China’s role in the conflict in Kachin, My-
anmar1 
 
 
The blind person never fears ghosts 
Burmese proverb 
 
 
Myanmar has been publicly acknowledged as problematic by Chinese leaders and is seen 
by the wider world as a regional challenge which Beijing should take the lead on. Since its 
separation from the British Empire, Myanmar (formally known as Burma), has been in con-
stant conflict. Several ethnic armed groups have taken up arms against the government 
demanding equal political, social, and economic rights. One of the country’s longest insur-
gencies – and one of the longest in the world – has been in Kachin State, which has been 
the site of many brutal military offences since the 1960s. Through rebel groups and local 
community organisations, the Kachin people have been pushing back against what they see 
as the government’s exploitative economic plans. When tensions along the China-Myanmar 
border escalated to threaten China’s border security in late 2012 and early 2013, China 
stepped up and got involved in the conflict, mediating between the government and the 
ethnic groups which changed its policy of non-interference as the country openly hosted and 
mediated the Kachin peace talks.  
 
In order to look at this case study more comprehensively, this chapter is going to first look 
at China’s neighbourhood policy in Asia and its policy in Myanmar in order to provide a 
broader background to the context in the country. The root causes of the Kachin conflict will 
be analysed as well as the role of China in the peace talks. China’s interests in the region 
will also be examined as they explain some of the reasons why China took such a decisive 
stand and played a pivotal role in this conflict, moving away from non-intervention into a very 
active conflict mediator role.  
 
 
                                                 
1 In 1989 the then military government changed the official name from Burma to Myanmar. This research will 
use the name Myanmar as is mostly used within the country and is in line with the practice of the UN and most 
countries outside North America and Europe. This is not a political statement or judgment on the right of the 
military regime to change the name of the country. 
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China’s Neighbourhood Diplomacy 
 
During much of the 1990s, and especially after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Beijing de-
cided to become far more proactive on its periphery and started engaging in improving its 
Asian relations, settling border and other disputes, and seeking to establish itself as a rising 
power more interested in regional cooperation than competition. It developed ‘China’s Good 
Neighbour Policy’ characterised by its willingness to accommodate the interests of its neigh-
bours and make compromises in order to build trust and increase Chinese influence. Ac-
cording to Lanteigne the reasons for this strategy were to halt any attempt by China’s neigh-
bours (especially those more aligned with the West) to restrain and contain China’s growing 
power; to convince its smaller neighbours that it was not seeking a hegemonic role in Asia 
but was interested in becoming an indispensable partner and potential alternative to Amer-
ican-led Western power; and to create a stable peaceful periphery to allow China to con-
centrate on its internal reforms (Lanteigne, 2009).  
 
So far Beijing has been successful in achieving its primary goals. It has resolved many bor-
der disputes with its neighbours (with the exceptions of Japan, Vietnam and India where 
tensions remain) and has adopted a more conservative, diplomatic approach to addressing 
inter-state differences that has improved and stabilised relations all around its periphery. On 
the economic front, China’s development has already benefited all of its neighbours. In 2014, 
China was the largest trading nation and a net capital exporter of outbound direct investment 
(Godement, 2015). As China’s trade and investment are mostly concentrated in Asia, these 
countries were the biggest beneficiaries. For instance, China started the so-called ‘Silk 
Roads project’ which aim at promoting economic development in neighbouring countries so 
as to better share China’s economic gains. For China, these projects will also benefit the 
country, as the wealthier the countries around China, the more sustainable China’s devel-
opment will be.  
 
In South Asia, China is becoming a key actor in conflict affected states. China’s policy in the 
region is driven by several factors, including its geostrategic rivalry with India, prioritisation 
of regime stability and economic expansion and natural resource requirements. In Pakistan, 
China is deeply concerned about insurgence particularly the support and training provided 
to Uighur separatists groups in Xinjiang and has provided significant counter-insurgence 
assistance to the Pakistan government. However, Beijing’s military assistance (both hard-
ware and nuclear technology) has fuelled the tensions between Islamabad and Delhi. 
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China’s previous policies in Afghanistan make Beijing a key actor to support peace and 
stability in the country. China’s investment in Afghanistan has the potential to stimulate 
growth and development and reduce fragility in the country, and its low profile and non-
interference stance in the past means that its viewed as a neutral party by most Afghan 
actors (Castillejo, 2013). Getting involved in the Afghanistan conflict poses a high number 
of risks to China, including threatening its economic and security interests in the region. 
However, Beijing seems eager to take these risks as it has recently engaged and supported 
the Pakistan-led efforts in the Afghanistan peace process. This makes Beijing a key stake-
holder in the Central Asia region, an actor expected to play a greater role in regional security 
efforts.  
 
China’s influence in the Asia region has also expanded but is not only driving from its hard 
economic power, but also in ways associated with soft power. For instance, in terms of 
higher education, training future generations of intellectuals, technicians, and political elites 
from other nations is a subtle but very important form of soft power. During the 2003 aca-
demic year, there were 77,628 foreign students studying for advanced degrees in China’s 
universities (approximately 80 per cent of which came from other Asian countries). That 
number grew to 377.000 in 2014 (source: Chinese Ministry of Education). China is also 
influencing the region through its ‘new security concept’ or ‘strategic partnerships’ that at-
tempt a new set of norms to govern interstate relations and prevent conflict, which resonates 
positively among many Asian nations and Asian institutions (Shambaugh, 2005). This is 
particularly the case in ASEAN, where China’s initiatives link very closely with ASEAN’s own 
norms and principles over respect of sovereignty articulated over many years. Another ex-
ample is the promotion of conflict prevention as opposed to military intervention in the region. 
Chinese current national security strategy focuses on limiting the possibilities of violent con-
flict in its borders and this strategy recognises that dialogue and the power of example have 
important roles to play in helping to prevent the negative consequences of power politics 
and the use of force (Odgaard, 2012). The application of China’s coexistence strategy to its 
border disputes has been an effective way of demonstrating the sincerity of these principles. 
For instance, China is seen as the country with the highest degree of influence over North 
Korea and has repeatedly called for calm on the Korean peninsula, as tensions between the 
two Koreans have risen. A Chinese official was quoted as saying: “We will carry on this 
tradition… boost strategic communication and coordination on key international issues and 
work for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula” (BBC News Asia, 2012). However, 
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the recent territorial disputes in the South China Sea have become a particular source of 
contention with a number of South-East Asian countries looking at the US for political sup-
port against China. 
China’s Myanmar Policy  
 
The 2000 kilometres border that separates southwest China from eastern Myanmar ensures 
that both countries have had significant relations for a long time, even if they had different 
traditions and religious (Myanmar is Theravada Buddhist country whereas China is a Con-
fucian one). However, Myanmar’s traditional ties with China were cut off by the British during 
the colonisation in the 1880s. But the decision by the British Colonial administration to ad-
minister Burma from New Delhi led to much bitterness amongst the Burmese and after the 
independence, the nationalists Burmese elites rejected membership in the British Common-
wealth and forged a non-aligned stand ruled by an oppressive military junta since 1962. 
Once Myanmar secured independence from Britain and China made its revolution, formal 
state-to-state ties developed and Myanmar was the first non-communist country to recog-
nise the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Despite these formal ties, Myanmar sought 
only limited alignment with China, focusing primarily on diplomatic support and protection, 
with only a moderate record of bilateral defence and security cooperation (Gungwu, 2005). 
However, bilateral relations were not very positive between the two countries as China 
chose to support the rebel Communist Party of Burma in the 1950s. During the Cultural 
Revolution, the relationship became very intense during the anti-Chinese riots in 1967 in 
Yangon, which marked a period of mutual hostility (Holliday, 2009). It was only after the 
beginning of the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s that the leaders of 
Myanmar began to build up a new level of trust with China, finding themselves on the same 
page on many questions. In defiance of much Western opinion, but in conformity with most 
Asian thought, they particularly agreed that the core principle of national sovereignty 
trumped almost any other in the international arena, and that matters like democracy pro-
tests and treatment of ethnic minorities were strictly domestic concern (Holliday, 2009). 
Through trade, investment and large-scale infrastructure projects undertaken by major Chi-
nese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to build dams and transport natural resources such 
as the future oil and gas pipelines traversing Myanmar, the two countries worked together 
closer than ever. China was one of the largest investor in Myanmar and Chinese SOEs were 
heavily investing in Myanmar’s natural resource sector. 
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During the time of the military junta regime, Myanmar was politically isolated from the rest 
of the world and there was pressure and criticism on China because of its close ties with the 
military regime. However, Tokyo was the largest provider of overseas development assis-
tance to Myanmar, with net disbursements of $30.9 million in 2006 (Odgaard, 2012), but 
Japan received no international criticism for its support to the Myanmar regime. The pres-
sure on China to intervene and use its influence in Myanmar was clearly reflected during the 
Saffron revolution in late 2007 when the country’s military government ordered a crackdown 
against anti-government demonstrations led by Buddhist monks, prompting an international 
outcry and placing Beijing in a difficult position. As China was one of the few countries with 
close ties to Myanmar, Beijing was prompted by the international community to influence 
Yangon to take a softer line. At first, Beijing kept with its traditional views on non-intervention 
but later called upon the government to settle the dispute in a more peaceful manner. This 
support for the military government reflected China’s interest in Myanmar’s political stability, 
including border security, the safety of Chinese investments, and the agreement for the con-
struction and future operation of dual gas and oil pipelines from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan.  
 
The process of reform in Myanmar started in November 2010, when military rule was re-
placed by a new military-backed civilian government. Some analysts believe that it was 
ASEAN policy of continuous and constructive engagement with Myanmar rather than the 
economic sanctions and political isolation promoted by the Wes that impacted the opening 
up. Through a gradual and persistent exposure to a variety of areas (economic, health care, 
education etc.), Myanmar government officials saw how other ASEAN countries had moved 
ahead introducing new norms.  Moreover, ASEAN’s decision to let Myanmar chair the re-
gional organisation was done to encourage Myanmar to pursue political reform (Mahbubani, 
2013). The US and the EU started to ease sanction and restrictions to Myanmar while the 
country started progress towards democracy and economic reforms. With the US keen to 
deepen its warming ties with Myanmar, Chinese leaders called for strengthening strategic 
trust between the two countries, as well as improved coordination and cooperation, reiterat-
ing China’s interest in a ‘peaceful, stable, independent and prosperous Myanmar’ (Haacke, 
2012). However, the US was also determined to re-establish relations with Myanmar as part 
of Obama’s administration policy focus on Asia. The US stated that its policy towards My-
anmar is pragmatic and is fundamentally about supporting democracy and human rights as 
well as stability and greater prosperity in Myanmar (Haacke, 2012). However, many analysts 
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believe that these developments are about encircling China and countering its emerging role 
in the Asia region. 
 
Background to the Kachin Conflict 
 
Myanmar is one of the world’s most diverse countries. Its seven states and seven regions 
are largely separated on ethnic grounds, with the country’s ethnic nationalities located pri-
marily in natural resource rich states forming a periphery around the Burman majority low-
land region that represents roughly 60 per cent of the population. The Kachin people are 
predominantly a Christian ethnic minority living mainly in Kachin state, with smaller pockets 
throughout the country and in border regions of China and India.  
 
The conflict between the people of Kachin and the Myanmar Government is one of the long-
est ethnic conflicts in the world. It dates back to the British colonisation period where central 
Myanmar was under direct administrative authority of the British empire while areas along 
the border were mostly left under the authority of their own chiefs. Ethnic groups in these 
borderlands were never fully controlled by a central state, and therefore they remained dis-
tinct from the majority Burman population in their cultures, traditions, languages, economies, 
and politics. During this time, many ethnic groups, like the Kachin, converted to Christianity 
while the majority population remained Buddhist. 
 
World War II increased the divide between ethnic groups and the Burmans and created 
further tensions as ethnic groups and the majority Burman population found themselves 
fighting each other supporting different sides. After the end of World War II, the Panglong 
Conference in 1947 was an attempt to unite the country as the “Independent Union of 
Burma”. Many representatives for ethnic states, such as Kachin, Shan, and Chin States, 
agreed to this Union as long as they could have political autonomy within their states and 
share the country’s wealth. When the border ethnic states were not awarded the political 
autonomy they were promised after the country’s independence, ethnic rebellions began to 
simmer and tensions between the majority and the minorities group increased. 
 
Although the Kachin were initially supportive of the central government when other ethnic 
groups began to rebel, they too rebelled in the late 1950s and early 1960s, along with Chin 
and Shan ethnic groups, when they felt the interests of ethnic minorities were being ignored. 
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The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) was established in 1961 to support the crea-
tion of an independent Kachin after frustrations from the unfulfilled Panglong Agreement and 
to address and support the civilian population suffering from the fighting. Tensions increased 
with the military coup in 1962, which was followed by increased frustration among ethnic 
groups and fighting between the military regime and ethnic minorities. Fighting between the 
KIO and the Myanmar government continued for decades and outlasted conflicts between 
the government and other armed ethnic groups with allegations of systematic use of torture 
by local human rights groups of Myanmar authorities against Kachin civilians (Fortify Rights, 
2014). 
Root Causes of the Conflict 
 
Historically, the Kachin people were never controlled by a central government, and they 
remained distinct in their culture and language as a result. The Panglong Conference in 
1947 was an attempt to bring the country together as the Union of Burma, and the Kachin, 
along with other ethnic minorities, participated only under the premise that they would have 
full political autonomy in their state(s). When the constitution went into effect the following 
year, the autonomy and power given to ethnic states was inconsistent with what they had 
wanted, ethnic rebellions began to form after rising tensions. Since then, the legitimacy and 
popularity has dramatically expanded in the ethnic regions to the point that currently, the 
KIO acts as a defacto government in KIO controlled areas and have their own officials and 
institutions which are parallel to those of the central Myanmar government.  
 
Many ethnic minorities, including the Kachin, feel that the central government is ignoring the 
interests of ethnic groups especially around access to education in their own language, free-
dom of religion and autonomy from the central government. Land acquisitions for develop-
ment projects are also causing widespread social, economic, and political instability. Kachin 
is rich in natural resources such as jade, gold, and timber, and there has long been a strug-
gle over these resources. Foreign investors are coming to the country creating in some 
cases additional grievances related to extractive industries as the economic benefits are not 
reaching the grassroots level of society. China is one of the major investors in the Kachin 
province and trans-shipment of oil and access to Myanmar’s natural gas reserves are among 
China’s foremost interests in the country. In 2010, China National Petroleum Company be-
gan the construction of a major oil and gas pipelines from Sittwe in Myanmar to Kunming, 
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the capital of the Yunan province. Myanmar’s hydropower resources are also a target for 
investment because they offer an abundant source of inexpensive energy close to the bor-
der that can be used to satisfy the growing Chinese demand (ICG, 2010). In addition, new 
land investment laws in Myanmar benefit large investors as opposed to small farmers, es-
pecially in ethnic minority regions, and they do not take into account land rights of ethnic 
communities (Transnational Institute, 2013). One natural resource that is prevalent in Kachin 
and contributes to the region’s instability is opium/poppy, which has increased in cultivation, 
production, and trade. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Source: 
UNODC), Myanmar produces 25% of the world’s estimated opium, and Kachin and Shan 
States have the most poppy growing areas in the country. Poppy cultivation in Myanmar 
increased by 17% in 2012 alone, despite the government’s eradication claims. Most of the 
heroin produced is destined for the illicit Chinese market, in response to which China has 
initiated opium substitution programmes in Northern Myanmar and Laos (Transnational In-
stitute, 2014). All the armed groups in the regions received pressure (especially from China) 
to impose opium bans. Despite these efforts and other Myanmar’s government political re-
forms on the eradication of poppy cultivation, the major cause of the increases of drug pro-
duction has been attributed to the ongoing instability and conflict (Burma News International, 
2014)  
Attempted peace negotiations in Kachin  
 
There have been several attempts to end hostilities in Kachin. The 1994 Ceasefire Agree-
ment between the KIO and the Myanmar government ended decades of fighting, but the 
political desires and ethnic grievances of the Kachin and ethnic populations were not ad-
dressed, and therefore the ceasefire was not conducive to sustainable peace. The text of 
the ceasefire agreement was short; it mentioned peace between KIO and government 
troops, the establishment of liaison offices to promote communication, and future develop-
ment and economic improvements in Kachin. The political dialogue and autonomy that the 
KIO desired was not achieved through this ceasefire, and tensions with the government 
continued as a result. 
 
The KIO participated in the National Convention process that resulted in the drafting of the 
2008 constitution. This process was deeply flawed, and while the KIO participated, they 
were given no substantive input, no political dialogue, and the grievances of ethnic minorities 
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were still not discussed (ICG, 2013b). After the KIO rejected the government’s demand of 
transitioning into border guard units, the government denied the registration of Kachin rep-
resentatives for the upcoming elections in 2010. The Myanmar government then declared 
the ceasefire ‘null and void’, ordered the closure of KIO liaison offices, applied economic 
pressure by blocking KIO trading routes, and began referring to the organisation as ‘insur-
gents’ in the state media (ICG, 2013b). The fighting resumed in June 2011 with regular 
clashes in several parts of Kachin and the Northern Shan states with allegations of serious 
human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law that left 100.000 inter-
nally displaced persons in government and KIO controlled areas (Source: UNOCHA).  
 
Peace talks began following the resumption of fighting in 2011, first at a local level and then 
at a national level. From the beginning of these talks, the KIO indicated that it would not sign 
another ceasefire without the presence of neutral witnesses and a promise from the govern-
ment for political dialogue. After multiple failed talks due to mistrust, disagreements and 
continued fighting, pressure and an intervention from China ultimately resulted in a seven-
point agreement in May 2013 where the UN and China acted as international observers. 
This seven-point peace agreement included plans to continue a political dialogue; work to-
wards de-escalation of hostilities; create joint monitoring systems and committees; address 
the needs of relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement of internally displaced persons; continue 
talks on the repositioning of troops; establish a KIO technical team in Kachin; and continue 
peace talks with the same group of observers (Ivanov, 2014). While this peace agreement 
might have been a positive step forward, there has been no political settlement or ceasefire 
since, and the fighting and clashes have continued to occur. 
The 2015 nation-wide Ceasefire Agreement 
 
In his inaugural speech in March 2011, President Thein Sein made a surprise announce-
ment and declared that his top priority was to build national unity and address decades of 
armed conflict by starting a process of national dialogue. The process started as a nation-
wide ceasefire agreement aiming to bring in all armed groups (including those that had al-
ready signed ceasefires) but it rapidly expanded from a national ceasefire to a much broader 
political dialogue on the future of the country that included all relevant stakeholders: armed 
groups, political parties and civil society (Yawnghwe, 2014). 
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The peace process in Myanmar has been domestically driven, driving in the first instance 
by government initiative, rather than resulting from international pressure. This has resulted 
in a limited role for the international community in the process. The peace process is highly 
complex with more than twenty parallel discussions underway between the government and 
the various ethnic armed groups. However, a small circle of reformers within government 
has worked with ethnic armed groups and civil society to press for transition and concrete 
reform. The Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) was established in 2012 to assist and coordinate 
the peace efforts by the government. In 2014, the Myanmar Peace Centre hosted discus-
sions with representatives of the ethnic armed groups. The group agreed to reconvene with 
drafts of a ceasefire agreement that would include background, aims and goals, ceasefire 
matters, ways/means for a lasting ceasefire, political dialogue guarantees, ongoing work, 
and general matters.  
 
Despite these efforts, it seems that the different parties and stakeholders of the conflict still 
have some differences. In the last 25 years, ethnic leaders have been persuaded that inde-
pendence is not an option and have generally accepted the idea of a federal union with 
equal power and autonomy (Yawnghwe, 2014). However, while the government is signing 
agreements and making commitments, it does not seem to be able to control the Tatmadaw 
(the Military Armed forces) and serious ceasefire violations continue. Moreover, the ethnic 
nationalists want political settlement, not economic privileges, and have rejected the notion 
of surrendering their arms without a guarantee that their grievances would be heard favour-
ably in a parliament that is more than 95 per cent controlled by the government (Ivanov, 
2014). 
 
After many talks with the armed groups, the government finally signed a final version of the 
National Ceasefire Agreement on the 15th of October 2015, less than a month before the 
general elections. But seven out of the initial fifteen ethnic armed groups refused to sign the 
ceasefire agreement, including the largest ethnic armed groups: The Kachin Independence 
Army, the Shan State Army and the United Wa State Army. Although this has been praised 
by the UN and Western Embassies as a ‘historical step towards achieving peace and na-
tional reconciliation' (US Embassy in Yangon) it seems like durable solutions and lasting 
peace in Kachin state still remains elusive. 
 
China’s role in the Kachin Conflict  
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Since the fighting in Kachin resumed in 2011, China has been heavily involved in finding a 
resolution for the conflict. Worried about border stability when stray shells landed across the 
border and security of its major investment projects in the area, China decided to become 
more proactive in the conflict. China issued an unusually strongly-worded statement ex-
pressing ‘strong concern and dissatisfaction with the situation, and demanding that Myan-
mar urgently investigate and adopt a series of measures to prevent further similar occur-
rences’, China went on to call on ‘both sides involved in the conflict in Myanmar to immedi-
ately implement a ceasefire and jointly protect the peace and stability of the China-Myanmar 
border area’ (ICG, 2013b). A high-level Chinese delegation met with President Thein Sein 
to discuss border stability, where China put considerable pressure on Myanmar to end the 
fighting and find a peaceful solution, while also committing to use its influence on the KIO to 
do the same. But it was a solid intervention from China that brought the Myanmar national 
government and the Kachin Independence Organisation back together to the negotiating 
table in February 2013, out of which the seven-point agreement was signed, referencing 
longstanding demands of the KIO on the need for force separation, a monitoring and verifi-
cation mechanism, and a dialogue on political issues (ICG, 2013b). 
 
China’s intervention in 2013 was firmer, bolder and more public than any other previous 
involvement in the conflict. China’s role in the process was central and instrumental in ar-
ranging the dialogue between the two parties. As fighting raged with the KIO along the Ka-
chin state border, this caused China to appoint a special envoy, Wang Yingfan, in March 
2013 to try and hammer out a new ceasefire deal. Due to the lack of trust between the KIO 
and the Myanmar government, both preferred a third party location. China not only provided 
the venue, but also explicitly guaranteed the security of all the participants. However, China 
purposely excluded the US and the UK from taking part in the talks. On the substance of the 
talks, China played a quiet, behind-the-scenes role of coordinating and mediating under the 
guidelines of ‘persuading for peace and promoting dialogue’ (Sun, 2013). A Chinese expert 
on Myanmar's northern affairs commented publicly that China ‘carefully listened to the de-
mands and conditions of both sides and actively mediated between them’ (Sun, 2013). 
 
China had never before played such a public role in an internal conflict between the central 
government and a local rebel group of another sovereign nation. Some analysts in Wash-
ington have expressed recognition and appreciation of China's stepping up to assume its 
‘big power responsibility’ in maintaining regional peace and stability (Sun, 2013). China had 
refused to play such an active role in the past, fearing it would be perceived by the Myanmar 
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government as interference in its internal affairs. But it was not the first time that the country 
had used its influence and power to stop the hostilities in Kachin. In 2010, when tensions 
peaked between the government and the KIO, many analysts cited Beijing’s mediation and 
pressures as a key factor in ensuring that tensions did not boil over (ICG, 2013b). But on 
this occasion, pressure was exerted more discreetly through the expression of private con-
cerns and pressure on both sides. 
The Chinese Dilemma - Relationship with the armed forces 
 
China managed to play such a critical role on the Kachin conflict because of the relationship 
the country has with both the Myanmar government and the ethnic groups and armed groups 
such as the KIO. In most parts of Kachin, the Myanmar state is not present or is only repre-
sented by the Tatmadaw, which for local populations is experienced as a violent and non-
legitimate force. Parallel ethnic administrations often enjoy considerably more local recog-
nition and support than those of the government, and in many areas the only existing ser-
vices are delivered by non-state actors, including community based organisations associ-
ated with armed groups. In the case of Kachin, the KIO has set up a parallel administration 
with a parallel government and institutions such as health, education etc. which are the de 
facto administration in all the non-government controlled areas in Kachin. Because of the 
relationship and legitimacy with the communities, these non-state actors are critical stake-
holders in the Kachin conflict.  
 
China has relationships with many armed groups and non-state actors in Myanmar that op-
erate close to their border, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) or the Myanmar 
National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). In the case of Kachin, China has had ties with 
both parties and has been supporting them for decades. For instance, the KIO rented a 
Casino area for 35 years to China who has their own private security forces in the area 
(called the Economic Zone Security Forces). China also trades with the KIO timber and 
natural resources which makes China one of the main sources of funding for the KIO (inter-
views in Myanmar). Because of this relationship with the KIO, China is perceived by the 
Kachin and Northern Shan communities as a key actor in the conflict. Local communities 
think that China has enough leverage on both sides to stop the conflict and establish peace 
but also China’s involvement and support to both sides is prolonging the conflict and could 
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be an obstacle to peace (Interviews and Save the Children assessment conducted in My-
anmar).  
 
Myanmar is a case study for the relationship of China with non-government actors. China is 
increasingly finding itself at odds with non-governmental actors and is being forced to realise 
that its focus on strictly inter-governmental relations while ignoring the needs and interests 
of ethnic nationalities, no longer serves its interest (Berger, 2013). Among Myanmar’s mili-
tary, the relationships of the non-government groups with various Chinese authorities led to 
the perception that the Beijing ‘maintains a balance of power between border ethnic groups 
and the military government to ensure that neither side gains the upper hand’ (ICG, 2009). 
Chinese analysts have suggested that Myanmar’s military worried that China would be able 
to draw on its contacts with the armed ethnic nationalities to cause problems should bilateral 
relations deteriorate, even if China’s official position is that the central government does not 
maintain formal relations or official contacts with any armed militias in Myanmar and that 
that there is no formal recognition, military support, exchanges or economic assistance to 
these groups (Berger, 2013). Nevertheless, the reality is that three of the largest armed 
groups (KIO, UWSA and MNDAA) have closer ties with China than with Myanmar central 
government. As the current October 2015 Nation Ceasefire Agreement does not include any 
of these groups, it is very likely that China will continue to play a decisive role in the peace 
process.  
 
Conflict in Kokang - another intervention from China 
 
Kokang is another self-administer region in Myanmar located in the northern part of the Shan 
state, and as Kachin, also bordering China. Kokang is mostly populated by Kokang or Ko-
kangese people, an ethnic Han Chinese group whose linga franca is Chinese. The region 
was part of China for several centuries until the Qing dynasty ceded it to Britain after the 
British conquest of Upper Burma in 1885.  Kokang was initially placed in China under the 
1894 Sino-British boundary convention but it was ceded to British Burma in a supplementary 
agreement signed in February 1897. Since becoming part of Myanmar and because of its 
strategic location, the region has formed a buffer between the Chinese Yunnan province 
and the Myanmar Shan States. For these reasons, the region has had strong social and 
economic connections with neighbouring China. Currently in Kokang, the main currency is 
the Chinese Yuan, some Kokangense have Chinese identity cards and there are many mi-
grant workers from China. From the 1960s to 1989 the Communist Party of Burma ruled the 
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area, and after the dissolution of that party in 1989 it became a special region of Myanmar 
under the control of the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). Ten-
sions between the MNDAA and the Myanmar government have been recurrent since the 
1960s and resulted in deadly offensives in 2009 and 2015. In both cases, refugees fled into 
the Chinese Yunan province.  
 
In February 2015 the fighting started when troops led by the veteran Kokang leader Pheung 
Kya-shin resurfaced in the Kokang region and attacked government and army positions after 
an interval of nearly six years. Fighting spilled across the border into China, killing five Chi-
nese citizens in a miss targeted airstrike by the Myanmar air force. The Kokang conflict in 
2015 displaced over 80,000 people most of whom fled across the border to China (source 
UNOCHA, 2015). As in Kachin, it was again a firm intervention and pressure from Beijing 
what prompted both sides to announced a unilateral ceasefire in June 2015 after four 
months of intensive fighting (ICG, 2015). The MNDAA issued a statement in which they 
acknowledge that ‘the Chinese government's strong calls for restoring peace in the China-
Myanmar border region were one of the reasons for the decision’ (Mclaughlin & Zaw 2015).  
 
Similarly to Kachin, the Chinese authorities have always maintained good relations with the 
MNDAA and other nationality forces in the northeast borderlands which provided China with 
strong leverage to influence both parties to the negotiating table when the fighting broke out. 
The Kokang crisis led China’s government to embark on a two-track strategy to try and bring 
peace and stability to its borderlands. On the one hand, the People’s Liberation Army troops 
were deployed to the border of the Yunnan province in order to ensure that the fighting will 
not spill inside China. On the other hand, China called on the government of President Thein 
Sein to solve the crisis through negotiations and Chinese officials also stepped up the sup-
port to the nationwide ceasefire talks in Myanmar and arranged an unusual ethnic summit 
in the Wa ethnic territory between the Myanmar government and several ethnic groups. 
Chinese officials were discreet about their presence, but participants recognised that the 
summit would not have been able to go ahead without the official blessing from China. Ac-
cording to an ethnic group leader who attended the summit: ‘China gave the green light, and 
facilitated travel to the meeting for some of the delegates’ (Transnational Institute, 2015). 
This meeting also reinforced the argument that the reality is that China, rather than the cen-
tral government in Myanmar, has always been the most important presence for many inhab-
itants of the Kachin, Shan and Wa borderlands since independence in 1948. The Kokang 
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conflict also shows that Beijing can be flexible on government-to-government relations and 
that it can use its influence with ethnic armed groups and bring them to the negotiation table. 
Moreover, Beijing hosted the leader of the Myanmar opposition party, Aung San Suu Kyi, in 
June 2015 to discuss the peace process in the country. During the visit, China drew attention 
to its role in peace efforts by stating that: ‘We hope that the conflicting parties meet each 
other halfway, exercise restraint, stop the war as soon as possible and restore normal order 
in the China-Myanmar border area’ that China supports ‘early realisation of peace and na-
tional reconciliation’; and that ‘China has actively promoted the peace process in northern 
Myanmar, (and) played a constructive role in accordance with the wishes of Myanmar and 
has been welcomed by Myanmar’ (Mclaughlin & Zaw 2015).  
 
More than Creative Involvement? Reasons for intervention 
 
China's intervention in the Kachin and Kokang conflict disputes China's traditional non-in-
terference on domestic affairs principle and represents an example of a ‘creative involve-
ment’ intervention. The interventions had the characteristics that Yizhou proposed: it had 
the consent from both sides of the conflict and significant Chinese interests were at stake. 
Furthermore, the interests at risk were broader than just purely economic benefits and they 
include the following: 
 
Economic Interest:  Kachin is an area rich in natural resources (gold, silver, copper, jade 
etc.) and it is also an area of heavy Chinese investment as it represents an energy corridor 
from the Indian Ocean port of Kyaukpyu. Also, China needs Kachin for economic growth in 
the border province of Yunnan. From China's perspective, the persistence of the Kachin 
conflict threatens the security and profitability of Chinese investments in the region. Its in-
vestments there include several hydropower projects in the area (some of which had to be 
suspended due to the ongoing conflict) and at least $2 billion spent on oil and gas pipelines 
crossing Myanmar into Yunnan (Economist, 2012). The energy corridor consists of twin 
pipelines to import natural gas and crude oil which are crucial for meeting Yunnan’s growing 
energy needs, and critical for China’s broader energy security, by providing an alternative 
route to the congested and strategically vulnerable Straits of Malacca (ICG, 2013b). These 
pipelines pass close to KIO-held areas in northern Shan State where armed clashes have 
frequently occurred. 
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Addressing Anti-Chinese Sentiment: Popular perceptions in Myanmar are that China had 
long colluded with the former military regime, providing political backing while exploiting My-
anmar’s natural resources. In recent years China’s growing economic ties with Kachin have 
benefited some of the state’s inhabitants, but are also seen by some as exploitative. As 
such, China does not want to fuel such resentment by siding too closely with the Burmese 
army in its fight against the KIO (Economist, 2012). Moreover, some of the investment pro-
jects are unpopular with the local communities as there was no consultation with the affected 
population (agreements were made with the Myanmar government only) which has created 
further resentment towards China. China is addressing its unpopularity in Myanmar by pro-
moting mutual understanding and cooperation between the people of the two countries. By 
intervening in the different ethnic conflicts, China can also demonstrate its peaceful inten-
tions with the local population.  
 
Border stability and nationalistic pressure: both the Kachin and the Kokang conflicts have 
imposed tremendous pressure along China's border. The recurrent escalation of tensions 
has led to Burmese artillery shells exploding inside China resulting in economic disruption, 
political disturbances and rising dissatisfaction regarding Myanmar's careless military ac-
tions among Chinese citizens (Sun, 2013). In addition, thousands of refugees have fled into 
China (i.e. at least 40.000 refugees from the Kokang region fled into China in 2009 and 
80.000 in 2015) and there is a potential for even larger influx should the situation deteriorate. 
This poses a dilemma to the Chinese authorities, as it also wants to keep on good terms 
with the Kachin and other ethnic minorities, who share ethnicity with groups on the Chinese 
side of the border. As Beijing strives to maintain a stable border, there has been mounting 
domestic pressure for authorities to take action and press for a ceasefire. The conflict was 
also widely reported in the Chinese press and on social media, generating public sympathy 
and support for fellow Chinese in the Kokang region. The Chinese public have expressed 
unhappiness with some of Myanmar’s actions towards China, including the cancellation of 
the dam infrastructure project, refugee flows, and the stray shells landing in China. There 
were also small protests by Chinese Kachin demanding that Beijing put pressure on Myan-
mar to end its offensive (ICG, 2013b). All of these factors combined created pressure on the 
Chinese government to adopt a stronger stance.  
 
Geostrategic rivalry: China's decision to step up its intervention in the conflict could have 
also been partially motivated by a potential US role. Some observers have noted that the 
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shift in China’s approach came shortly after the U.S. ambassador to Myanmar visited Kachin 
State in December 2012 (ICG, 2013b), along with rumours that the U.S. might be intending 
to play a mediation role (which could potentially insert a US presence right along China’s 
border). Given the geostrategic rivalry between the U.S. and China in the region, the pro-
spect of Washington becoming involved in an issue on China’s border may have galvanised 
a more proactive response from Beijing. 
 
Some of these interests are conflicting with each other, resulting in China’s inconsistent 
policy towards the Kachin peace process. However, all of these factors might have informed 
China’s decision to intervene so assertively in the conflict.  
 
Moving from a non-intervention approach 
 
Although the official rhetoric remains consistent in relation to China’s standpoint on foreign 
affairs and intervention, the more complex and multifaceted China’s international relations 
become, the more stretched these principles appear in practice. Beijing is finding increas-
ingly hard to reconcile its global economic expansionism, which entails protecting Chinese 
economic interests overseas, with a non-interventionist foreign and security policy. The in-
tervention of China in Myanmar represents an example of this evolution and a divergence 
from Chinese foreign policy’s traditional non-interference principles. It shows that as China's 
national interests expand and diversify, so too will its foreign policy principles. It also repre-
sents an example of a ‘creative involvement’ intervention. As long as the intervention has 
the consent from both sides of a conflict in the host country and China has significant inter-
ests at stake, Beijing seems to be willing to demonstrate some flexibility, to experiment and 
to adapt. It has also positioned China openly as a mediator and a tacit guarantor of any 
agreement reached between the parties, which evidence its intentions as an emerging re-
sponsible power. The last chapter is going to examine how China can use all the knowledge 
and experience acquired through these interventions into the redefinition of peacebuilding.   
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Chapter Six: Same objective, different approaches: Op-
portunities for Peacebuilding  
 
 
‘The asking of questions itself is the correct rite’ 
Confucius, The Analects  
 
 
China has demonstrated in Myanmar a more flexible interpretation of its policy of non-inter-
ference and that it is ready to engage more proactively in conflict affected states. The Sudan, 
Xinjiang and Myanmar examples have shown that whether it is unintended or not, China’s 
investments and policies in conflict-affected countries have an impact on the conflict dynam-
ics of the countries. The leverage that China has with governments (and armed groups as 
in the case of Myanmar) in these countries, through its economic investment, also makes 
China a key stakeholder in any conflict. Therefore, China’s engagement has altered the 
context in which international efforts to build peace and stability take place and its involve-
ment can either support or undermine the peacebuilding influence of western donors in con-
flict-affected states. 
 
Western states value China’s contribution to peacebuilding and hope it will take more re-
sponsibility, but simultaneously they also have suspicions about China’s growing power and 
intentions. As previously discussed, China is becoming a key peacebuilding actor in the 
international arena because of its considerable political leverage and influence in many con-
flict-affected states. Also, Beijing is demonstrating a notable growing interest in peacebuild-
ing demonstrated in the evolution of Chinese foreign policy from a reluctance to get so in-
volved in what it saw as domestic affairs to intervening in certain countries and increasing 
their support to international peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. This evolution is 
part of China’s global peace engagement strategy but Beijing seems to be cautious with its 
approach as a new member of the international world order. On the one hand, China knows 
that being inactive on the world stage could be defined as ‘irresponsible’, but being too active 
could also regarded as ‘irresponsible’ because some analysts (mainly Western) are wary of 
China’s intentions and are unfamiliar with China’s growing contribution to peacebuilding. To 
avoid being perceived as a threat, in many cases, China has decided to keep a low profile 
and avoid taking a leadership position. 
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But as all the case studies have demonstrated, China has the potential to play a larger role 
in consolidating peace and to bring stability to conflict affected contexts and for these rea-
sons, China can and should become an international actor in peacebuilding efforts. How-
ever, China’s views on peacebuilding bring a different and distinctive perspective, one that 
focuses more on economic development rather than in building a liberal state and a civil 
society which contrasts with the Western approach. But the differences on approach should 
not prevent China from being part of the debate moving forward to re-define peacebuilding. 
This does not necessarily mean China should adopt a Western-style approach to peace-
building, but rather, China can contribute to the debate in re-defining peacebuilding bringing 
its philosophical values on conflict prevention and a strong government as well as using its 
undoubted economic and diplomatic leverage to promote more inclusive and sustainable 
political solutions that also have a strong economic development approach.  
 
In order to understand some of the distinctions in approaches between the Western and the 
Chinese peacebuilding models, this final chapter is going to analyse some of these differ-
ences as well as the successes and challenges from the Chinese approach. Currently there 
are some opportunities for engagement with China, which will be described. The examples 
of some of the present cooperation initiatives between China and western countries will 
illustrate that Beijing’s policies have completely evolved in the last decades and that China 
is now ready to become a proactive member of the international community.   
 
Different approaches to Peacebuilding  
 
China and Western countries have different understandings over what constitutes peace-
building. These main differences between the Western and the Chinese model are summa-
rised in the table below:  
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 Western Perspective China’s Perspective 
Objective of peacebuilding Liberal democratic System, 
Priority of Market Economy  
Priority of Economic Development 
Focus of Peacebuilding Good Governance Strong Government  
Principles of Peacebuilding Principle of democratic promotion 
and principle of necessary inter-
vention 
Principle of Aiding and Assistance 
orientation and principle of non-in-
tervention  
Strategic Culture of Peacebuild-
ing 
Pre-emptive Reactive response 
Peacebuilding Methodology  Interaction between up and down: 
establishment/amendment of con-
stitution, holding general elec-
tions, establishing multi- party 
systems, strengthening civil soci-
ety  
Top-down approach: improve the 
administrative functions of the na-
tional organisations of the country 
concerned; enhance the capacity 
building of the country concerned. 
Promote economic recovery 
Challenges  Challenge local ownership 
Prescriptive solutions based on 
the liberal model 
Lack of public participation 
Not context specific - economic 
development does not always ad-
dress the root causes of the con-
flict 
 
 
 
 
 
Western countries adhere to the ‘liberal peace’ agenda which, as examined in chapter two 
of this research, is a simultaneous pursuit of economic and political reform placed alongside 
measures to resolve the conflict and where peace is ensured by liberal democracy and a 
market economy. Therefore, the objective of Western countries’ involvement in peace build-
ing is to achieve liberal democracy and to promote democratic systems. In post-conflict set-
tings, this involves promoting measures such as the amendment of the constitution, holding 
a general election, establishing a multi-party system, fostering the opposition party and de-
veloping civil society. As also discussed in chapter two, the last decade has seen a move 
towards a more indigenous form of peacebuilding that is more driven by the local community 
(instead of imposed by the outside) but which is still rooted in liberal values.  
 
By contrast, China maintains that liberal democracy is not a panacea, and that a one-size-
fits-all model will not work. China believes every country has its own priorities and to promote 
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democratic system immediately after the end of conflicts is not necessarily a must choice 
(Lei, 2011). Furthermore, China believes that the UN should refrain from imposing any pre-
determined model of governance. Instead, as examined in chapter three, China believes 
that measures such as reducing poverty and resolving unemployment are usually the most 
important tasks to be promoted in the aftermath of a conflict. According to Chinese thinking, 
security and development are intrinsically linked, and peacebuilding would be impossible 
without achievement on the development front. Some Chinese scholars also believe that 
poverty itself should be treated as a non-derogatory core human right, and that no country 
should use any excuse, including that of promoting democracy or eradicating corruption, to 
derail efforts aimed at fighting poverty (Weiwei, 2012). The Chinese approach also takes a 
heavily state-centric view, namely that the focus of the peacebuilding work should be on 
enhancing the concerned country’s capacity building instead of weakening its leadership. 
This implies direct government-to-government support to strengthen the state. Such an ap-
proach, emphasising economic growth and a strong state, is shared with some Western 
states. However, China and Western states have divergent views on the need for political 
reforms which have led to tensions between China and other members of the international 
community, particularly where state actors in the conflict-affected countries in question are 
themselves parties to the conflict, and/or deploy heavy-handed methods of political control 
(Saferworld, 2012). 
 
China also has a different perspective on the links between peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing missions. For Western academics, while peacekeeping aims to realise ‘negative’ peace, 
meaning no armed conflicts between or within countries, peacebuilding is about creating or 
restoring stable political, economic and social conditions for long-lasting peace (that is, ‘pos-
itive’ peace). As a traditionally wary country, China recognises that peacebuilding is even 
more complex than peacekeeping. China is not in favour of peacebuilding merged with mil-
itary action, humanitarian intervention or regime change, and strongly opposes any opera-
tion of state-building as it sees it as a violation of the principles of respect of state sover-
eignty. Therefore, China takes a firm stance on the possibility of a ‘Western right’ to inter-
vene in the name of peacebuilding, and tries to limit any possible Western interventions, for 
instance, by using its veto power in the UN security council. According to Lei, this demon-
strates the subtle but significant shift of Chinese strategic culture from passively satisfying 
international norms to actively shaping them (Lei, 2011) 
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Typology of Chinese Interventions 
 
The different studies and examples used throughout this research demonstrate that China’s 
typology of intervention is heavily influence by the interests at stake. It is safe to assume 
that the bigger and more influential interests at risks, the more robust is the intervention. 
Based on the case studies used throughout this research, the table below summarises the 
types of interventions and some of the interests and triggers that led to the decision on the 
intervention.  
 
Type of Intervention  Examples Interests and Triggers 
Non-interference / Non-inter-
vention 
China abstaining on UN Secu-
rity council resolutions that ad-
vocated for intervention (i.e. 
Libya) 
Perceive as a neutral power 
Soft power Academic Cooperation in Cen-
tral Asia, Confucian Institutes 
in several countries, proactive 
multilateralism (i.e. SCO) 
Strategic positioning, reputa-
tional/image 
Foreign Aid 
 
Mozambique, Algeria, Sudan 
and South Sudan 
Economic interests and coop-
eration 
Peaceful Coexistence North Korea Border Stability 
Creative involvement Mediator between Sudan and 
South Sudan to protect oil in-
vestments. Shuttle diplomacy 
between India and Pakistan. 
Economic interest, stability to 
protect investments 
Firm intervention Kokang and Kachin ceasefires Economic interests, border 
stability, nationalistic pressure, 
geo-rivalry with the US 
 
From this sample of case studies, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
 
1. China uses non-interference interventions and soft power as a way to project an im-
age of a peaceful nation and a peaceful rise. It is more of a proactive policy of chang-
ing the world’s perception around China’s image and strategically positioning China 
as an alternative to Western powers.  
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2. All the other types of intervention (foreign aid, peaceful co-existence, creative involve-
ment and firm interventions) require consent from all parties involved. China only in-
tervenes if they are requested to and only after the consent by all parties has been 
agreed.   
3. The bigger the interests, the firmer and bolder is the intervention. Considerable Chi-
nese interests at stake (for instance, economic interests and protection of Chinese 
investments, nationalistic pressure around security of Chinese personnel or attacks 
on Chinese investments and citizens or geo-rivalry with the US) are likely to lead to 
a stronger intervention. For instance, becoming the mediator between Sudan and 
South Sudan or between India and Pakistan. 
4. Border stability plays a key role in defining the type of intervention. From the case 
studies analysed in this research we can conclude that China is likely to intervene 
more robustly in any conflict around its periphery. This was demonstrated in the Ka-
chin and Kokang case studies in Myanmar were China actively intervened to stop 
hostilities. In Central Asia, although China is playing a more low-key role allowing 
Russia to continue to be the hegemon power in the region, it is likely that it will inter-
vene more strongly if further instability and conflict happen in the region. Similarly, 
China plays a key role with North Korea, as it is the only country that can influence 
the North Korean government. If the situation in North Korea deteriorates to the point 
where refugees could start crossing Chinese borders it is likely that China will use its 
influence to halt atrocities.  
5. None of the interventions use military means or threats. They all rely on economic 
incentives, mediation and diplomacy.  
 
However, due to limited case studies, this model is not robust enough to provide evidence 
for a consistent Chinese approach for intervention in conflict areas, this model is just an 
early analysis. Future research should focus on further analysis on the triggers that lead to 
a firmer intervention of China and comparative analysis between intervention around border 
areas with China (North Korea, Central Asia, Myanmar etc.) and other conflicts elsewhere. 
From this initial analysis it is safe to assume that stronger interventions will happen in border 
areas but further analysis should be conducted on the different triggers and interests that 
lead to more robust interventions both in border areas as well as in other locations in order 
to establish a pattern. Further research should also concentrate on the type of interventions 
that China uses. China’s role and positioning in the world order keeps evolving and adapting. 
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Future research should also examine whether China continues using diplomacy, economic 
incentives and mediation as the main means to conflict resolution or if it shifts towards 
stronger actions (such as military threats or interventions). This will help define a stronger 
typology of interventions that could help recognise when and how China could intervene in 
a conflict. Key case studies such as the potential role of China mediating in the Afghanistan 
conflict will also need to be examined as, if successful, they could promote China’s role as 
a peacebuilding actor.  
 
The role that China could play in the future, as an alternative power to the West bringing an 
alternative model of coexistence and peacebuilding, will largely be determined by the suc-
cess of their peacebuilding model. The next section will examine some of the challenges 
and successes of the current Chinese approach to peacebuilding.  
 
Successes and challenges of the Chinese approach 
 
While China shares with the West some peacebuilding principles and belief in the benefits 
of strong state-building and economic development for post-conflict states, Chinese officials 
remain deeply sceptical towards peacebuilding agendas that include democratisation and 
imposition of elections as part of a peace process. However, the two approaches agree on 
the fundamental principles of economic development, strong state and conflict prevention 
as fundamental parts of any peacebuilding process. As these three areas are focus domains 
that China could bring to the peacebuilding debate, the following section is going to examine 
them, looking at some of the successes and challenges of their implementation so far.  
Economic Development and Peacebuilding  
 
China’s focus on economic development as part of its peacebuilding approach could con-
tribute to the debate around the re-definition of peacebuilding. Although the Western ap-
proach to peacebuilding also takes into account economic development as a key feature for 
peacebuilding, it is less prominent than in the Chinese approach. Conflict, violence and 
peace both shape and are shaped by the economy. Underdevelopment, unequal access to 
resources and poverty are causes of conflict and are drivers of violence. Absence of liveli-
hoods and social economic deprivation, particular when coupled with a sense of historical 
marginalisation animate grievances in populations. The need and desire for access to and 
control over resources has always been a cause of conflict, especially when resources are 
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or are perceived to be scarce, or where the rules and norms of access and control are poorly 
institutionalised. But when well-managed, natural resources can be a source of economic 
progress, wealth and stability for a country. When mismanaged or misappropriated, they 
can have severely negative economic, social and environmental effects and constitute a 
massive loss for peacebuilding and development. A prominent UN study has suggested that 
since 1990 there have been at least 18 violent conflicts strongly fuelled by natural resources 
exploitation and that natural resources related conflicts experience an earlier and higher 
probability of relapse than others (Jolliffe, 2014a). Therefore, progress in economic devel-
opment is critical to prevent relapses into conflict and to achieve durable solutions and sus-
tainable peacebuilding. According to Saferworld boosting employment and promoting eco-
nomic development in post-conflict states has significant dividends for maintaining peace, 
creating occupations for young, unemployed men who have little other experience beyond 
war (Saferworld, 2011). Supporting economic development after a conflict has provided pos-
itive results in the past. For instance, the Marshall Plan was a successful example of using 
economic means to speed up the process of post-conflict reconstruction, which had far-
reaching consequences for Europe, both East and West. The aim of the Marshall Plan was 
to actively revive the German economy as quickly as possible in order to provide the means 
of survival for the refugees and the homeless. This was further strengthen by currency and 
fiscal reforms of the first post-war German government, which is regarded by many as the 
reason why Germany’s economy recovery was faster than any other European country’s 
despite receiving less aid per capita under the Marshall plan than its European neighbours 
(Ashdown, 2007). Economic development can also support and ensure sustainability cease-
fire or any type of peace agreements. For instance, in the context of the ceasefires in Kachin, 
almost 20 years since return and resettlement was attempted, the majority of the population 
remain displaced, or have become so for a second time. The fragility of ceasefires, and their 
inability to ensure displaced populations’ protection in the long term, appear to be the main 
factors hindering a durable solution (Jolliffe, 2014a). Smart economic policy will be crucial 
to future reintegration efforts and could be supported by international agencies. Effective 
reintegration programmes should include robust economic policies and ensure local owner-
ship and participation of all stakeholders in order to ensure sustainability. Also, making pro-
gress on the economy is probably the best exit strategy for an international peacebuilding 
or statebuilding mission in a post-conflict setting. 
 
Challenges with Economic Development 
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While China has the potential to contribute to post-conflict economic development, there are 
equally serious questions surrounding an approach that is purely economic. There is no 
doubt that in some conflict-affected states China is an important source of economic support 
for post-conflict reconstruction. However, any intervention by an external actor will affect the 
distribution of power and resources in that context. Depending upon how and to whom it is 
delivered, development assistance can increase inequalities and divisions between commu-
nities, at local and national levels. The risk is that over time the flow of Chinese (or other 
country’s) resources into conflict-affected states may fuel existing inequalities and exclusion, 
thus strengthening drivers of conflict. Therefore, economic development can have negative 
impacts on peacebuilding processes, as economic activity is not neutral which can be unfa-
vourable for peace. An economy that excludes certain identity groups can create frustration 
and grievances. For instance, wealth generated from primary exports is easily captured by 
narrow groups who enrich themselves; this can be linked to corruption, which also fuels 
grievances (International Alert, 2015). Also not all the countries have favourable settings for 
economic development as in many countries large-scale investment into indigenous re-
sources may be the answer, but many post-conflict countries do not have the wealth or the 
natural resources that can immediately attract large-scale investment.  
 
As seen in the case studies, despite some of the achievements in terms of economic pro-
gress seen in the examples of Tibet and Xinjiang, economic development on its own may 
not resolve unrest or address the root causes of the conflict as the source of grievances is 
not only related to economic power. More understanding on the causes of the conflict as 
well as a better context-sensitive approach are needed for China to have a more successful 
peacebuilding policy. The Kachin and Xinjiang case studies also illustrated that if the nature 
of the investment and infrastructure projects is purely extractive and there are limited bene-
fits for the local communities and population, frustration and resentment against China and 
Chinese investments could be exacerbated. China should acknowledge that economic de-
velopment on its own is not sufficient to build inclusive and sustainable peace; and that 
economic co-operation and other forms of assistance can exacerbate conflict dynamics. 
Therefore, economic development in conflict-affected countries must take into account the 
local context in order for it to be designed to strengthen sustainable peace. 
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Promoting a strong and developmental State 
 
The Chinese approach to peacebuilding advocates for a strong government and institutions. 
China promotes strong and stable regimes by providing top-down support to strengthen 
state capacity. But the developmental state that the ‘Asian Tigers’ have set up has demon-
strated a successful but different kind of political governance to that of the Western model. 
Their economic approach does not follow neoliberalism policies or the Washington consen-
sus policies on trade liberalisation that were promoted by the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. In some Asian countries including China the main characteristic of 
this developmental state is that its popular legitimacy rests in significant part on the ability 
of the state to deliver continued economic growth and not on holding leaders accountable 
through a democratic process. This characteristic gives little space for civil society and 
grassroots initiatives which are the cornerstone of Western Peacebuilding interventions. For 
western academics a strong civil society should be a main feature of a strong state. For 
instance, Ashdown argues that efficient democratic institutions and a civil society strong 
enough to protect these from the abuse of power and from the actions of an over-mighty 
executive are the necessary elements of a well-functioning state, especially after a conflict. 
Using a more top-down peacebuilding approach like the one the Chinese approach advo-
cates for, can potentially create major risks, especially when state actors are themselves 
conflict actors and heavy-handed top down impositions of security make matters worse. But 
trying to impose a civil society from the outside can also have negative repercussions. After 
the intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ashdown declared that the international com-
munity cannot create that civil society and that the only people who can do that are the 
members of the society itself (Ashdown, 2007). But it seems that China’s view on civil society 
might be evolving as well. Lei believes that the role of civil society in peacebuilding has 
gained wide recognition in China, and the emergence of civil society in China (with 431,000 
civil society organisations at the end of 2009) has created new opportunities for citizen par-
ticipation in peacebuilding (Lei, 2011). The creation and proliferation of NGOs in China rep-
resents a significant opening of Chinese society, an opening that would have been incon-
ceivable in the time of Mao Zedong and even Den Xiaoping. The growth of civil society in 
China and the pressure that they can bring to the government could potentially lead to a 
more dynamic and sustainable peacebuilding policy that also supports the development of 
civil societies as a characteristic of the state.  
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Conflict prevention as opposed to military intervention 
 
China advocates for diplomatic options and conflict prevention measure such as dialogue, 
diplomatic mediation and economic assistance instead of an intervention by force or eco-
nomic sanctions. This approach has been welcomed by most of the Asian countries who 
share similar principles and values and China has applied the approach to its border dis-
putes which has proved to be an effective way of demonstrating the sincerity of these prin-
ciples. However, conflict prevention remains a relatively undeveloped area of foreign policy 
within China (Saferworld). There appears to be limited discussion of how China’s economic 
role overseas, alongside other tools such as diplomacy and mediation, can be proactively 
leveraged to prevent conflicts before they reach a crisis stage. As China engages with more 
conflict affected countries, it encounters a range of new risks and challenges, particularly 
with regards to its financial investments, its reputation in the country as well as on the world 
stage, and the safety of Chinese citizens, as demonstrated in the examples of Myanmar, 
South Sudan and Sudan.  
 
These three areas of economic development, strong development state and conflict preven-
tion have demonstrated that although there are differences in the approaches between the 
Western and the Chinese model, the goals and aims are similar. The Chinese approach is 
also evolving so there could be more room for cooperation in some of the more contentious 
issues such as promoting civil society. However, this provides the opportunity for greater 
policy engagement in conflict prevention issues and the next section will examine some of 
the opportunities that China has for engagement moving forward. 
 
Looking forward: Opportunities for Peacebuilding 
 
The next decades will see more pressures on states and societies such as demographic 
trends (population growth, increasing urbanisation), economic trends (more inequality and 
unemployment) or climate change (more natural disasters and climatic fluctuations). These 
pressures will likely increase the risk of conflict and new forms of conflict dynamics such as 
newer terrorist methods, more chronic violence or new threats. As seen with the recent Eu-
ropean migrant crisis, these conflicts will no longer be contained in a single country and the 
risks of multiple countries being affected by conflict or regional conflicts is much higher. In 
order to face these challenges, peacebuilding and prevention capacities need to be devel-
oped further and rendered more effective. Given this context, extra support from China for 
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peacebuilding initiatives will potentially be very valuable in addressing some of these global 
challenges. These differences between the western and the Chinese approach earlier ex-
amined may become obstacles to co-operation. However, there is a need for more discus-
sion on what peacebuilding should constitute in order to find areas where international ac-
tors can co-operate more closely or, at the very least, identify areas where Western states 
and China may be able to make complementary contributions. Some of these opportunities 
for engagement with China (and other rising powers) include the review of the United Na-
tions peacebuilding architecture and cooperation in foreign aid.  
Review of the UN peacebuilding Architecture 
 
The ten-year review of the Peacebuilding Architecture and the High-Level Independent 
Panel on Peace Operations are opportunities to strengthen peacebuilding practice inside 
and outside the UN. The review of the UN peacebuilding architecture offers an international 
platform in which rising powers can participate to ensure a more inclusive, less western 
dominated process. The challenges that the review should address and that are highlighted 
in the White Paper on Peacebuilding from the Peacebuilding Platform include issues that 
China agrees and supports. For instance, the paper highlights the current challenges with 
peacebuilding: the absence of a shared perception of what constitutes ‘peacebuilding prac-
tice’; peacebuilding directed by external interveners is no longer a politically and practically 
viable approach; many peacebuilding professionals observe a reduction of operational 
space to build peace and that there has been a shift towards a securitisation of peace and 
development work (White Paper on Peacebuilding, 2015). Moreover, the review of the 
United Nations peacebuilding architecture in 2015 emphasises conflict prevention which is 
one of the characteristics of the Chinese peacebuilding approach. The Report of the Advi-
sory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture 
stated that: 
 
‘Sustaining peace should be understood as encompassing not only efforts to prevent 
relapse into conflict but also to prevent lapse into conflict in the first place. When 
considering the peace and security activities of the United Nations, therefore, a 
strong emphasis must be place on conflict prevention’ (United Nations, 2015) 
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Because China could contribute towards this debate, Beijing should be part of any review 
of the UN peacebuilding architecture in the future in order to foster cooperation and to pro-
mote a more global approach. Recent examples prove that China is willing to cooperate with 
Western countries on issues that are related to and are in accordance with its peacebuilding 
approach. For instance, there have been some recent examples of cooperation to promote 
conflict prevention. China has engaged in Saferworld’s Conflict Prevention working group, 
a project with the United Kingdom government which aims to improve constructive dialogue 
between the Chinese and the UK policy communities on issues related to conflict prevention, 
and to increase knowledge of the two countries’ respective efforts towards conflict preven-
tion in conflict-affected and fragile states (http://www.saferworld.org.uk/where/conflict-pre-
vention-working-group).  
 
Collaboration in Foreign Aid 
 
Peacebuilding strategies need to reflect the changes in donor and aid context as traditional 
western donors no longer have their previous influence over development assistance. West-
ern countries are beginning to have less leverage over recipient governments and the threat 
of diplomatic isolation by the West now carries less weight. The assumption that Western 
donors can guide conflict-affected states towards peace through a combination of aid and 
conditionality becomes more questionable which has implications for the Western principle 
of linking aid to government performance on issues like governance, peacebuilding or hu-
man rights. At the same time, China’s understanding of its economic aid as ‘neutral’ in con-
flict affected countries is problematic as aid always has an impact on internal politics and 
power relations.  
 
As China emerges as a major player in the field of foreign aid, some of the traditional West-
ern donors have begun to seize the opportunity to engage China in development coopera-
tion in an effort to form new joint-venture programs and facilitate mutual understanding. 
Western states and non-state actors seeking to promote an international peacebuilding 
agenda should engage with the Chinese peacebuilding community to make the case that 
conflict-sensitivity investment and mutual collaboration is in China’s own interests. As China 
increases its engagement in fragile contexts, it will need to develop new policies to shape 
this involvement and could learn from other countries. Such cooperation and linking of re-
sources could play a significant role in improving aid quality and effectiveness throughout 
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the developing world. It could also help both China and established Western donors learn 
from each other in the rapidly evolving aid landscape. There have already been some in-
stances of cooperation between China and western countries. For instance, in July 2013, 
China Agricultural University and the UK Department for International Development, with 
the endorsement of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, launched a project aimed at 
strengthening research capacity in China on international development cooperation. Also in 
2013, a Memorandum of Understanding on Development Cooperation Partnership was 
signed between Australia and China to strengthen cooperation and collaboration between 
the two countries in the delivery of aid in the Asian Pacific (Taidong, 2013). These two initi-
atives represent recent and positive developments in aid collaboration between established 
Western donors and China. As the world evolves and with the rise of new powers, new 
multilateral frameworks for development should be formulated on the basis of dialogue be-
tween states, including China and other rising powers in order for them to be more impactful 
and effective. Also, by offering alternative sources of support to that of the traditional West-
ern donors, China and other new actors are introducing more competition into the ‘donor 
market-place’. According to Richmond and Tellidis, China is not attempting to overturn or 
replace the established rules and norms; rather, it is weakening the position of western do-
nors in respect of aid-receiving countries, exposing standards and processes that are out of 
date and ineffectual (Richmond and Tellidis, 2014). For these reasons, China is already 
acting as an alternative model to the West which is in turn forcing western countries to review 
some of their principles and approaches in conflict-affected countries. This means that na-
tional governments in conflict-affected states have more choice regarding from whom they 
receive assistance, and more options regarding the terms of such support. 
 
Can China become a key actor in supporting peace and stability? 
 
One of the main challenges which China faces in order to become a key peacebuilding actor 
is on human rights. China is achieving political and territorial cohesion with a one-party state 
regime which is more repressive at home and more open to the outside world. As the ex-
amples of Xinjiang and Tibet have illustrated, ethnic discrimination and religious repression 
justified by the government in the name of the ‘fight against separatism, religious extremism, 
and terrorism’ continue to fuel rising tensions in both provinces. But while there is reason for 
the government’s concern with widespread violence in these provinces, discriminatory and 
repressive minority policies only exacerbate the problem and do not solve the root causes 
of the conflict. These policies also intensify the portray of China as an authoritarian and 
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repressive regime at the international level. This perception limits the legitimacy of Chinese 
interventions in other countries as they tend to be seen as suspicious by governments and 
international civil society groups.  
 
Human rights do not single China out as a key peacebuilding actor but rather, they reflect 
the limitation and challenges that China faces at the international level. However, a shared 
concern in the West and China (and other rising powers) over stability in conflict-affected 
states provides a foundation for dialogue about peacebuilding. Therefore, as this research 
has argued, there is a need to further engage or develop new forums and mechanisms for 
constructive policy engagement and dialogue with new rising powers. This will represent an 
opportunity to engage with these new actors based on shared interests in, and concern to 
promote, peace and stability.  
 
As the fastest rising power, China has a growing influence and leverage in selected coun-
tries and contexts, even if its presence is primarily commercially-driven to serve domestic 
economic growth, and focused at the level of the state, in line with Beijing’s own approach 
to development and stability. China is starting to export its own norms and principles on 
peacebuilding and foreign aid. While certain policies are consistent with well-established 
norms and initiatives, the country’s foreign policy uses its status as the leader of developing 
countries in order to influence the debate towards a non-Western approach. But as seen in 
some of the examples, China’s interventions carry political implications, impacting the con-
flict and security dynamics in the countries with which it engages. China needs to be more 
aware of the context in which it operates as well as to have a better understanding of the 
conflict dynamics and root causes of the conflict, not only internationally, but also in dealing 
with its domestic conflict at home as illustrated by the case study in Xinjiang. As China be-
comes more integrated into the global order and assumes the responsibilities that come with 
this involvement, Beijing needs to re-evaluate and adapt its foreign policy principles and 
approach if it really wants to support peace and stability.  
 
It is in China’s interests to maintain national stability and peace with other countries as it 
supports its domestic economic growth and the stability within its own boundaries. China’s 
foreign policies and principles have evolved over the last decades and recent examples 
demonstrate that Beijing is looking to cooperate with international institutions and/or other 
countries on conflict resolution mechanisms and approaches. In the changing world order, 
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the international community badly needs China to play a more active role, to increase its 
input in all fields of global governance and conflict resolution, and to make a contribution 
commensurate with its current strength and influence. Currently there is a real opportunity 
to develop more complementary approaches between China and the West. Western actors 
must seek to better understand China’s interests, the nature of its engagement and oppor-
tunities for influence. Proactive and constructive engagement by the West on these issues 
can help shape how China engages in conflict-affected states in the future. Ultimately, not 
to recognise the impacts of China’s engagement undermines peacebuilding and conflict res-
olution, and the world will benefit if established and emerging donors can find common and 
cooperative approaches to peacebuilding and foreign aid that enhance effectiveness and 
attack global poverty and conflicts with combined resources.  
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Annex 1: List of people interviewed in Myanmar 
 
 
In Yangon  
Non-structured interviews conducted over several trips to Myanmar between 2013 and 2014 
 
1. Conflict Adviser, Department for International Development (DFID), British Embassy 
2. Government Liaison Officer, British Embassy Yangon 
3. Deputy Representative, UNICEF Myanmar 
4. Director, Listening Program, CDA Collaborative Learning Project 
5. Associate Director Do No Harm Programme, CDA 
6. Project Manager, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Myanmar office 
7. Senior Advisor on Peacebuilding and Peace Processes, DAI, US Embassy 
8. Country Director in Myanmar, Search for Common Grounds 
9. Associate Program Director, Myanmar Peace Centre 
10. Peacebuilding Programme Manager, ACTED Myanmar   
11. Head of Field Coordination Unit, UNOCHA, Yangon 
12. Executive Director (Myanmar), The Border Consortium 
13. Deputy Country Representative, Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID 
14. Country Director for Myanmar, Non-violent Peace-force, 
15. Consultant, International Crisis Group 
16. Attaché, Programme Officer (Peacebuilding) Delegation of the European Union to My-
anmar 
17. Programme Manager, Drugs & Democracy Programme, Transnational Institute, Myan-
mar Office 
18. Executive Director, Euro-Burma Office in Myanmar 
19. Health Coordinator, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
20. Executive Director, Swe Tha Har Social Services (Myanmar national NGO) 
21. Programme Advisor, Swe Tha Har Social Services (Myanmar national NGO) 
22. Senior government relations director, Save the Children International, Yangon 
23. Country Director, Danish Refugee Council  
24. Programme Director for Myanmar, Mercy Corps 
 
In Muse, Northern Shan State  
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Non-structured interviews conducted between 4 and 11 March 2014 
 
1. Programme Director, Wunpawng Ninghtoi (WPN) – Local Kachin organisation 
2. Programme Manager, Health Poverty Action, Kachin office 
3. Health programme manager, MERLIN, Northern Shan office 
4. Security Manager, Save the Children International, Northern Shan Office 
5. Programme manager, Save the Children International, Northern Shan Office 
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